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I. INTRODUCTION
The American federal system as we know it today was not planned.
We did not adopt a Constitution at the time of Independence or at any
time thereafter establishing the structure of a federal system and
allocating power between the federal government and the states., Rather
the structure of the American federal system has evolved over a period of
time as a result of the Supreme Court's interpretation of the provisions of
t Distinguished Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law School. A.B., 1956,
University of Pittsburgh; J.D., 1959, University of Pittsburgh.
1. Contrast the Canadian federal system that was established by the Constitution Act
of 1867 (formerly the British North America Act). In the Canadian system, a particular
power is either a federal power or a provincial power, and there is very little overlap. See
the discussion in Robert A. Sedler, Constitutional Protection of Individual Rights in
Canada: The Impact of the New Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 59 NOTRE
DAMEL. REv. 1191, 1195-1201 (1984).
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the Constitution dealing with federal and state power and the Court's
development of constitutional policy with respect to the nature and
operation of the American federal system.2
The American federal system consists of four components: (1) state
sovereignty and constitutional limitations on state power; (2) the powers
of the federal government; (3) the relationship between the federal
government and the states; and (4) the relationship between the states.3 In
this writing, I will set forth the constitutional doctrine applicable to each
of these four components. It is my hope that in so doing, I will succeed in
explaining the structure of the American federal system. I will also
demonstrate that, for the most part, constitutional doctrine relating to
state and federal power and to the relationship between the federal and
state governments and between the states themselves is fairly well-
settled, and such change, as may be occurring, is mostly around the
edges.4 The essential nature of the American federal system, as it has
evolved from many years of constitutional interpretation by the Supreme
Court, remains unchanged.5
We start out with three basic propositions underlying the American
federal system. First is the matter of state sovereignty. The American
federal system, as it now exists, began with the states.6 In American
constitutional theory, upon Independence, the newly-formed states
succeeded to the power over domestic matters formerly exercised by the
British Crown, and as each new state was admitted to the Union, it
automatically became entitled to exercise this power.7 Thus, state
sovereignty is a "given" in the American constitutional system, and the
states do not depend on the federal Constitution for the source of their
sovereignty. 8 The states exercise full sovereignty over domestic matters
except to the extent that a particular exercise of such sovereignty is
prohibited or restricted by the Constitution.
9
2. Robert A. Sedler, The Settled Nature ofAmerican Constitutional Law, 48 WAYNE
L. REV. 173, 177-78 (2002).
3. Id. at 220.
4. Id. at 176.
5. Id. at 176-77.
6. Id. at 220.
7. Id.
8. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 294 (1936).
9. Sedler, The Settled Nature, supra note 2, at 220. Upon Independence, that aspect
of the sovereignty of the British Crown pertaining to foreign affairs devolved upon the
"Union of States" that was waging the Revolutionary War and that eventually concluded
the peace with Great Britain. Id. In American constitutional theory, sovereignty over
foreign affairs was deemed to be in the federal government that was subsequently
established by the Constitution. Thus, the foreign affairs power is an inherent federal
power. As the Supreme Court stated in United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937):
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In terms of allocation of power, the Constitution restricts state
sovereignty over domestic matters in essentially three ways. First, it
provides that certain powers, very few in number, are exclusively federal
powers, in the sense that they cannot be exercised by the states at all,
such as the power to enter into a treaty or the power to coin money,' ° or
can only be exercised by the states with the consent of Congress, such as
the power to impose a duty of tonnage or to the power to enter into a
compact with another state or foreign government." Second, under the
Supremacy Clause' 2 there is federal supremacy in the event of a conflict
between federal and state power.' 3 Congress then has the power to
preempt state regulation over particular issues or over particular areas of
activity. Federal preemption is very important in practice, and
preemption cases come before the Court with considerable frequency.'
4
It is with respect to preemption that the matter of "states rights" is most
starkly presented, and we will see that in the area of preemption, both
Congress and the Court have tried to strike a balance between the
principle of federal supremacy and the principle of state sovereignty.
Third, the Court has held that the affirmative grant of the commerce
power to Congress has a negative or dormant implication, and we will
see that the negative aspect of the Commerce Clause imposes some
important, but precisely defined, limitations on the power of the states to
regulate and tax interstate and foreign commerce.' 5 Subject only to these
"In the case of all international compacts and agreements . .. complete power over
international affairs is in the national government and is not and cannot be subject to any
curtailment or interference on the part of the several states." Id. at 331.
10. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. In order for a power to be an exclusive federal
power, it must be affirmatively granted to Congress by Article I, Section 8, and either
expressly denied to the states by Article I, Section 10, or be of such a nature that the
exercise of power by the states would be incompatible with its exercise by Congress.
Research has disclosed no case where the Supreme Court has specifically held that a
particular power is an exclusive federal power by implication. "[T]wo powers that
necessarily would be exclusive federal powers would be the naturalization and
immigration power and the power to fix the standards of weights and measures." Sedler,
The Settled Nature, supra note 2, at 220 n.268. The bankruptcy power is not an exclusive
federal power. See Sturges v. Crowinshield, 17 U.S. 122, 123-28 (1819). Neither is the
power over copyright. See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 571 (1973).
I1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2, 3. In addition to interstate compacts, some
American states have received Congressional approval to enter into compacts with
neighboring Canadian provinces, such as the Great Lakes Compact entered into between
the states bordering the Great Lakes and the Province of Ontario. See MICH. COMp. LAWS
ANN. § 324.32 101 (West 2009).
12. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
13. Id.
14. Sedler, The Settled Nature, supra note 2, at 220.
15. Id. at 221.
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limitations, the American states have plenary power over all activity that
takes place within their boundaries.' 
6
The second proposition is that the dominant feature of the American
federal system as regards domestic matters is concurrent power.'7 While
in constitutional theory the powers of the federal government are only
those enumerated in the Constitution, we know that those powers,
particularly the power of Congress over interstate and foreign commerce,
have been construed very broadly by the Court, so that with few
exceptions, today virtually any activity is subject to congressional
regulation. The expansive interpretation of federal power interacts with
state sovereignty, with the result that to a large extent, both the states and
Congress have enormous regulatory power and both can usually regulate
the same activity. Thus, it can be said that the dominant feature of the
American federal system as regards domestic matters is concurrent
power. And for the most part, the reach of federal and state power and
the resolution of conflicts between federal and state power is essentially
settled by existing constitutional doctrine.
The third proposition is that the states form a national union. It
cannot be disputed that a primary motivating force behind the calling of
the constitutional convention in 1787 and the resulting new Constitution
was to transform the loose confederation of sovereign states into one
nation, an "indestructible union composed of indestructible states"' 8 and
to "constitute the citizens of the United States as one people." 19 The
provisions of Article IV, Section 1, dealing with Full Faith and Credit to
judgments and public acts of sister states, and Article IV, Section 2,
dealing with Privileges and Immunities of the citizens of sister states and
interstate rendition, are specifically directed toward this end. We will
discuss both provisions in our discussion of the relationship between the
states themselves. In addition, precisely because the United States is a
federal union, there is a generic right of citizens to travel from one state
to another.20 Finally, the Constitution requires that Congress admit new
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. The Supreme Court has said that, "[t]he Constitution, in all its provisions, looks to
an indestructible Union, composed of indestructible States." Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700,
725 (1869). Because this is so, the Court held in that case that during the civil war, the
Confederate states remained in the Union, notwithstanding that they were trying to
secede from it. Id. at 726.
19. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 180 (1869).
20. The Court has stated that "[tihe constitutional right to travel from one State to
another.., occupies a position fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union." United
States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757 (1966). In that case, the Court upheld the power of
Congress to make it a crime to interfere with interstate travel. Id. at 760. The right of
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states to the Union on an "equal footing" with the same attributes of
sovereignty as were possessed by the original thirteen states,21 and that
the United States guarantee to each state "a republican form of
government," 22 and to protect the states against invasion or domestic
violence.23
For the last decade or so, there has been considerable academic
debate on the subject of federal and state power, revolving around the
contention that the Supreme Court should curtail the range of federal
power and to that extent avoid possible interference with the exercise of
state power. 24 On the Court itself, particularly under the leadership of
former Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, there have been expressions
of concern about the expansion of federal power operating to diminish
interstate travel was first recognized in Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. 35, 49 (1867), where
the Court held unconstitutional a state's imposition of a head tax on the exit of all persons
from the state. In Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 177 (1941), the Court held
unconstitutional as an undue burden on interstate commerce a state law that prohibited
bringing an indigent person into the state. The law also violated the right of interstate
travel, as the concurring Justices emphasized. Id. at 178-81 (Douglas, J., concurring); Id.
at 182-84 (Jackson, J., concurring). There are two other components of the right of
interstate travel: the right to be treated as a welcome visitor when a citizen of one state is
temporarily in another state, protected by the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article
IV, Section 2, and for those citizens who elect to become permanent residents of another
state, to be treated equally with other citizens of that state, which is protected as one of
the Privileges and Immunities of national citizenship under Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 500-03 (1989).
21. In Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 203-08
(1999), the Court held that recognition of Indian rights to hunt, fish, and gather on state
land, provided for under a treaty between an Indian tribe and the federal government, was
not irreconcilable with a state's sovereignty over the natural resources in the state, and so
the treaty was not abrogated upon admission of the state to the Union. Id at 205-06.
22. The Court has held that it is the responsibility of the President and Congress to
guarantee to the states a "republican form of government," and that the political question
doctrine precludes the federal courts from deciding what constitutes a "republican form
of government." Pac. States Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, 149 (1912). It also
precludes the courts from deciding which competing group is the "lawful" government of
the state. Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1 (1849).
23. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
24. For a sampling of the voluminous academic commentary, see Jesse H. Choper &
John C. Yoo, The Scope of the Commerce Clause After Morrison, 25 OKLA. CITY U. L.
REV. 843 (2000); Grant S. Nelson & Robert J. Pushaw, Rethinking the Commerce
Clause: Applying First Principles to Uphold Federal Commercial Regulations but
Preserve State Control Over Social Issues, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1999); Jay S. Bybee,
Insuring Domestic Tranquility: Lopez, Federalization of Crime, and the Forgotten Role
of the Domestic Violence Clause, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1997); Stephen Gardbaum,
Rethinking Constitutional Federalism, 74 TEx. L. REV. 795 (1996); Deborah J. Merritt,
Reflections on United States v. Lopez: Commerce!, 94 MICH. L. REV. 674 (1995).
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traditional areas of state authority.25 As we will see, there have been two
cases, one in 1995,26 and one in 2000,27 where the Court has ruled against
the exercise of federal power under the Commerce Clause. However,
these were very narrow decisions that did not undercut the line of growth
of decisions expanding the range of federal power.28 And in the Court's
most recent decision dealing with the exercise of federal power, it
appeared that the Court was coming down even more strongly on the side
of federal power when it held that so long as the class of activities that
Congress was regulating came within the reach of federal power, it was
not necessary to show that Congress could independently regulate the
local activity that came within that class of activities.29 In my opinion,
the academic debate on the subject of federal and state power is truly
academic, and I have no interest in participating in it. Again, my purpose
in this writing is to explain the structure of the American federal system
and to demonstrate that the essential nature of the American federal
system, as it has evolved from many years of constitutional interpretation
by the Supreme Court, has not changed and is not likely to do so.
II. STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON STATE
POWER
As stated at the outset, state sovereignty is a "given" in the American
constitutional system, and the states exercise full sovereignty over
domestic matters except to the extent that a particular exercise of such
sovereignty is prohibited or restricted by the Constitution.30 Moreover, as
we will see, although Congress has the power to preempt state laws, both
Congress, in specifically dealing with preemption in the legislation it
25. Writing for the Court in United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), Chief
Justice Rehnquist observed that: "Were the Federal Government to take over regulation
of entire areas of traditional state concern, areas having nothing to do with the regulation
of commercial activities, the boundaries between the spheres of federal and state
authority would blur." Id. at 611. Similarly, Justice Clarence Thomas, concurring in
Morrison, stated: "Unless this Court replaces its existing Commerce Clause jurisprudence
with a standard more consistent with the original understanding, we will continue to see
Congress appropriating state police powers under the guise of regulating commerce." Id.
at 611.
26. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
27. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 627.
28. See infra notes 112-17 and accompanying text.
29. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22, 23 (2005). In that case, the Court held that
Congress had the power to prohibit the local cultivation and use of marijuana for medical
purposes, even though this was authorized by state law. See infra notes 118-23 and
accompanying text.
30. Sedler, The Settled Nature, supra note 2, at 220.
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enacts, and the Court, when deciding questions of federal preemption,
have tried carefully to strike a balance between the principle of federal
supremacy and the principle of state sovereignty. 31 The result has been
that in practice federal preemption has been somewhat limited and has
not substantially impaired state sovereignty or altered concurrent power
as the dominant feature of the American federal system.
32
From a federalism standpoint, the most important constitutional
limitation on state sovereignty relates to state power to regulate and tax
interstate and foreign commerce. 33 The Supreme Court has long held that
the affirmative grant of the commerce power to Congress has a negative
or dormant implication, and imposes some important, but precisely-
defined, limitations, on the power of the states to regulate and tax
interstate commerce.3 4 The Court has never developed a comprehensive
conceptual justification for a negative aspect to the Commerce Clause. It
has merely stated that this constitutional restriction on state power is
either predicated on the "implications of the Commerce Clause itself' or
on the "presumed intention of Congress" that the states not impose
certain kinds of regulations on interstate commerce. 35 While many
31. Id. at 225.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 220. Federalism considerations generally do not affect the Court's
application of the individual rights provisions of the Constitution. That is, in practice the
individual rights provisions operate substantially the same with respect to actions of the
federal and state governments. The only apparent exception is that because of Congress's
plenary power over immigration, the Court has held that Congress can enact
discriminatory legislation against aliens that the states cannot do under the Fourteenth
Amendment's equal protection clause. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 80-85 (1976);
cf Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376-80 (1971). In addition, Congress' plenary
power over immigration has been a factor that the Court has considered in invalidating
state laws discriminating against aliens, that such discrimination interferes with the
exercise of Congress' plenary power. See, e.g., Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 12 (1977)
(denying alien college students financial aid unless they had affirmed their intention to
apply for citizenship as soon as they were able); Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 226 (1982)
(denial of free public school education to undocumented alien children).
34. As the Court stated in Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 769 (1945):
"For a hundred years it has been accepted constitutional doctrine that the Commerce
Clause, without the aid of Congressional legislation, thus affords some protection from
state legislation inimical to the national commerce, and that in such cases, where
Congress has not acted, this Court, and not the state legislature, is under the Commerce
Clause the final arbiter of the competing demands of state and national interests." Id.
35. In Southern Pacfic, the Court stated: "Whether or not this long-recognized
distribution of power between the national and state governments is predicated upon the
implications of the Commerce Clause itself, or upon the presumed intention of Congress,
where Congress has not spoken, the result is the same." Id. at 767-68 (internal citations
omitted). The Court again stated, in California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 728 (1949):
"Certain first principles are no longer in doubt. Whether as inference from congressional
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academic commentators, including the present author,36 have questioned
this kind of conceptual justification for a negative aspect to the
Commerce Clause, 37 and while Justices Scalia and Thomas of the current
Court have rejected the concept of a negative aspect to the Commerce
Clause,38 the Court as an institution has consistently adhered to it, and
the negative aspect of the Commerce Clause continues to operate as a
discrete limitation on the exercise of state power to regulate and tax
interstate commerce.
Structurally, the negative aspect of the Commerce Clause is best
analyzed as a residual restriction on state power. Since Congress has
plenary control over interstate commerce, the first step in any challenge
to a state regulation of interstate commerce is to consider the effect, if
any, of federal law on the state regulation in issue. It is possible that the
state regulation has been preempted by federal law and if so, the state
silence, or as a negative implication from the grant of power itself, when Congress has
not specifically acted we have accepted the Cooley [Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S.
(12.How.) 229 (1851)] case's broad delineation of the areas of state and national power
over interstate commerce." In its most recent negative Commerce Clause case, United
Haulers Association v. Oneida-Herkimer, 550 U.S. 330, 338 (2007), Chief Justice
Roberts, writing for the Court, stated simply: "Although the Constitution does not in
terms limit the power of States to regulate commerce, we have long interpreted the
Commerce Clause as an implicit restraint on state authority, even in the absence of a
conflicting federal statute." Id.
36. See, e.g., Robert A. Sedler, The Negative Commerce Clause as a Restriction on
State Regulation and Taxation: An Analysis in Terms of Constitutional Structure, 31
WAYNE L. REv. 885, 968-82 (1985).
37. Some of the numerous other writings include: Donald H. Regan, The Supreme
Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84
MICH. L. REv. 1091 (1986). Mark Tushnet, Rethinking the Dormant Commerce Clause,
1979 Wis. L. REv. 125; Earl M Maltz, How Much Regulation is Too Much? An
Examination of Commerce Clause Jurisprudence, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 47 (1981);
Julian N. Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L.J. 425 (1982);
Martin H. Redish & Shane V. Nugent, The Dormant Commerce Clause and the
Constitutional Balance of Federalism, 1987 DUKE L.J. 569; Patrick C. McGinley,
Trashing the Constitution: Judicial Activism, the Dormant Commerce Clause, and the
Federalism Mantra, 71 OR. L. REV. 409 (1992); Michael A. Lawrence, Toward a More
Coherent Dormant Commerce Clause: A Proposed Unitary Framework, 21 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 395 (1998).
38. Justice Scalia considers the "so-called negative Commerce Clause" an
"unjustified judicial expansion not to be expanded beyond its existing domain," and on
stare decisis grounds, would accept it only as a basis for invalidating a state law that
facially discriminated against interstate commerce or a state law that is indistinguishable
from a type of law previously held unconstitutional by the Court. United Haulers, 550
U.S. at 348 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Thomas would go even further and would
"discard the Court's negative Commerce Clause jurisprudence." Id. at 349. (Thomas, J.,
concurring in judgment).
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regulation is inoperative. 39 Conversely, Congress may decide that it will
exercise its power over interstate commerce in such a way as to authorize
state regulation that otherwise would violate the negative aspect of the
Commerce Clause. 40 The rationale here is not that Congress has the
power to authorize the states to take action that violates the Constitution,
which it does not. Rather, it is that the Commerce Clause is not a
limitation on the exercise of Congressional power, but only on the
exercise of state power. So, once there is Congressional authorization,
the affirmative aspect of the Commerce Clause rather than the negative
aspect controls, and the challenged state regulation is necessarily
immune from constitutional challenge under the negative Commerce
Clause. 4' The state regulation, of course, may be challenged as violative
of the individual rights provisions of the Constitution, such as the
42Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause. In Metropolitan Life,
the Court held that a discriminatory state tax on out-of-state insurance
companies, immune from negative Commerce Clause challenge due to
Congressional authorization, was violative of the equal protection
clause. 43 The case is of dubious value as an equal protection precedent,
since, as dissent charged, the majority's analysis is very similar to a
39. See Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372-73 (2000).
40. See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 423 (1946); Northeast
Bankcorp, Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 472 U.S. 159, 175-76 (1985). In
Benjamin and Northeast Bankcorp, Congress expressly authorized discriminatory state
regulation that, in the absence of Congressional authorization, would be violative of the
negative aspect of the Commerce Clause. As the Court stated in Benjamin: "[1It has never
been the law that what the states may do in the regulation of commerce, Congress being
silent, is the full measure of [Congress'] power .... So to regard the matter would invert
the constitutional language into a limitation upon the very power it confers." Benjamin,
328 U.S. at 422-23.
41. For example, as regards the authorization of discriminatory state regulation, as in
Benjamin and Northeast Bankcorp, the Commerce Clause does not prohibit Congress
from regulating in such a way as to discriminate against interstate commerce in favor of
local commerce. This being so, Congress may set up a regulatory scheme that
incorporates state regulation discriminating against interstate commerce. Benjamin, 328
U.S. at 432-34; Northeast Bankcorp, 472 U.S. at 174-75. For the view that while
Congress itself may discriminate, it should be precluded from validating state laws that
would otherwise violate the negative aspect of the Commerce Clause, see Norman R.
Williams, Why Congress May Not "Overrule" the Dormant Commerce Clause, 53
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 153, 238 (2005). The Court has not drawn this distinction. Indeed, as
the Court observed in Benjamin: "[This] broad authority Congress may exercise alone
[or] in conjunction with coordinated action by the states, in which case limitations
imposed for the preservation of their powers become inoperative and only those designed
to forbid action altogether by any power or combination of powers in out governmental
system remain effective." Benjamin, 328 U.S. at 434-35.
42. See Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 883 (1985).
43. Id.
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negative Commerce Clause analysis. The Court has emphasized,
however, that Congress must "manifest its unambiguous intent" before a
federal statute will be read to permit what would otherwise be a Negative
Commerce Clause violation. a
In most of the cases involving constitutional challenges to state
regulation of interstate commerce, there is neither preemption nor
Congressional authorization, and the Court applies negative Commerce
Clause doctrine to determine whether the particular regulation violates
the negative Commerce Clause.
The Court's current approach to constitutional challenges to state
regulation under the negative aspect of the Commerce Clause contains
both a "non-discrimination" component and an "undue burden"
component. In practice, however, the Court has invariably invalidated
regulations that it found to be "discriminatory," but when the state
regulation is truly non-discriminatory, the Court has, with few
exceptions, rejected the "undue burden" challenge. 45
It is necessary to explain further what is meant by the "non-
discrimination" component of the negative Commerce Clause. The
Court's articulated doctrine draws a distinction between laws that on
their face discriminate against interstate commerce and laws that on their
face do not. The Court has stated that, "[w]here simple economic
protectionism is effected by state regulation, a virtual per se rule of
invalidity has been erected. ' 6 Where the law is not discriminatory on its
face, the Court says that it applies the Pike test, 47 under which the state
law will be upheld "unless the burden imposed on interstate commerce is
clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits. 4 8 In practice,
however, where the Court finds that a purportedly neutral law has the
effect of discriminating against interstate commerce or out-of-state
interests in favor of local commerce or in-state interests because of the
interstate nature of that commerce or the out-of-state nature of those
interests, the Court has held the law unconstitutional. Thus, the non-
discrimination component of the negative Commerce Clause includes
both laws that are discriminatory on their face and laws that have a
discriminatory effect on interstate commerce.
44. Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 458 (1992); Hillside Dairy, Inc. v. Lyons,
539 U.S. 59, 66 (2003).
45. See discussion infra pp. 1496-1506.
46. Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978).
47. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
48. The Court emphasized this distinction in most recent negative Commerce Clause
case. United Haulers, 530 U.S. at 338-39.
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The reason why the Court has invariably invalidated a state
regulation that it has found to discriminate against interstate commerce
relates to the fact that a major historic purpose for the affirmative grant
of the commerce power to Congress was to overcome the
"protectionism" that had existed on the part of the states during the
period between the end of the Revolutionary War and the adoption of the
Constitution. 9 Since "economic protectionism" may result from state
regulation that is neutral on its face but has a "protectionist" effect, the
negative aspect of the Commerce Clause reaches both state regulation
that discriminates against interstate commerce on its face and state
regulation that in practical operation has a discriminatory effect against
interstate commerce.
50
The results of the Court's decisions under the non-discrimination
component of the negative Commerce Clause may be explained as
follows: where the essential effect of the regulation is to discriminate
against interstate commerce or out-of-state interests in favor of local
commerce or local interests because of the interstate nature of that
commerce or the out-of-state nature of those interests, the regulation is
violative of the negative Commerce Clause.5'
A regulation has the essential effect of discriminating against
interstate commerce or out-of-state interests in favor of local commerce
or in-state interests when, on its face or in practical effect, it either (1)
49. See Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 522, 527 (1935).
50. The Court has stated that where the state regulation is discriminatory on its face,
the virtual per se rule of invalidity "can only be overcome by a showing that the State has
no other means to advance a legitimate local purpose." United Haulers, 550 U.S. at 338-
39. The Court has also looked to the availability of non-discriminatory alternatives when
invalidating a facially neutral law that has a discriminatory effect on interstate commerce.
See, e.g., Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 355 (1951) (alternative means of
ensuring purity of milk other than requiring that it be processed at approved facility
located within five miles of city). In practice, reasonable non-discriminatory alternatives
will always be available. They were not used precisely because the state or local
government wanted to engage in "economic protectionism." Id. at 354-55. The only case
where the Court has sustained a state law due to the absence of reasonable non-
discriminatory alternatives is Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 151-52 (1986), where the
state prohibited the importation of live baitfish that could not be shown to be free of
parasites that could endanger local species of fish that were parasite free. This case is
better explained as coming within the "quarantine and inspection" exception to the
negative aspect of the Commerce Clause, which permits a state to bar "harmful" products
from another state, such as cattle infected with bovine disease. See Mintz v. Baldwin, 289
U.S. 346 (1933).
5 1. Sedler, The Settled Nature, supra note 2, at 230. The author formulated this test
over twenty years ago and submits that it continues to explain the results of the Court's
decisions under the non-discrimination component of the negative Commerce Clause.
Sedler, The Negative Commerce Clause, supra note 37, at 898.
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prohibits or restricts the entry of out-of-state products into the state,52 (2)
prevents local products from leaving the state or gives local residents
preferential access to local products,53 or (3) otherwise provides an
advantage to local commerce over interstate commerce.54 To the same
effect is Toomer v. Witsell,55 where the Court held that a state law
requiring that owners of shrimp boats licensed to fish in the state's
waters unload and pack their catch in the state before shipping it to
another state, was unconstitutional.
52. See Lewis v. B.T. Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 53 (1980) (prohibition against
out-of-state banking institutions controlling in-state investment advisory firms);
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 629 (1978) (prohibition on private landfills in
state receiving out-of-state waste); Dean Milk Co., 340 U.S. at 354-57 (municipal law
prohibiting sale of milk in city that was not processed at approved facility located within
five miles of the municipality); Baldwin, 294 U.S. at 511 (prohibition of sale in New
York of milk purchased from farmers in other states at lower prices than the New York
minimum price); Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 465 (2005) (state regulatory scheme
allowing in-state wineries to make direct sales to consumers, but prohibiting out-of-state
wineries from doing so). In Granholm, the Court was divided over whether this type of
discrimination was permitted under the Twenty-First Amendment and/or specifically
authorized by federal law, with the 5-4 majority holding that it was not. Id. at 471, 493.
53. See New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331 (1982) (ban on
exportation of hydroelectric power produced by privately-owned facilities in the state);
Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979) (ban on exportation of small fish caught in
waters within the state); Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941 (1982) (ban on exportation
of ground water to adjoining states that did not grant reciprocal rights with respect to
exportation of water to the state); H.P. Hood & Sons v. DuMond 326 U.S. 525 (1949)
(refusal to license milk processing facility on express ground that facility would divert
local milk supplies to other states).
54. See Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977). In
Hunt, North Carolina required that all apples sold in closed containers in the state either
use the grading system approved by the United States Department of Agriculture or carry
a "non-graded" label. The State of Washington had developed a grading system that was
considered in the industry to be superior to the Department of Agriculture grading
system, and this being so, the application of the requirement to apple containers coming
from Washington deprived the Washington apple growers of a competitive advantage
they enjoyed because of the out-of-state origin of Washington apples. Another example
of such a situation is Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. 397 U.S. 137 (1970), where the Court
held that an Arizona regulation requiring cantaloupe growers in Arizona to package the
cantaloupes picked there in containers bearing the Arizona name and address of the
packer was unconstitutional. Id. at 146. A packer having a packing facility across the
border in California challenged the regulation, and the Court held it unconstitutional as
imposing an "undue burden" on interstate commerce. Id. However, The Court should
have more properly invalidated the regulation on "discriminatory effect" grounds,
because its effect was to divert employment and business from California to Arizona. The
packer necessarily would be more likely to employ Arizona workers and use Arizona
suppliers if it had to maintain the packing facility in Arizona than it would if it could
retain its California facility. So, the effect of the regulation was to favor in-state interests
(here Arizona employees and suppliers) over out-of-state interests.
55. 334 U.S. 385 (1948).
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On the other hand, if the regulation affects local commerce and
in-state interests in the same way that it affects interstate commerce and
out-of-state interests, it does not have a "discriminatory effect" for
negative Commerce Clause purposes, although it regulates a product that
is primarily destined for the interstate market. Similarly, the
"discriminatory effect" must be "because of" the interstate nature of that
commerce or the out-of-state nature of that interest. The fact that the
regulation benefits one kind of economic interest at the expense of a
different kind of economic interest does not make it "discriminatory" for
negative Commerce Clause purposes, even though the economic interest
benefited is primarily local while the economic interest disadvantaged is
primarily interstate.
56
The Court's most recent negative Commerce Clause case involved
the question of what constitutes "discrimination" for negative Commerce
Clause purposes.57 The Court had long held the states could not bar the
importation of out-of-state waste by privately-owned landfills in the
state.5 8 The more recent landfill cases have involved more indirect
methods to prevent out-of-state waste from coming into the state, but the
Court held these methods to be unconstitutional as well. They have
included: imposing a higher fee for disposal at a private facility of waste
generated outside the state than for disposal of waste generated inside the
state;59 a prohibition against private landfill operators accepting solid
waste generated in another county within the state unless expressly
authorized by the receiving county; 60 and a "flow control" law requiring
that all non-recyclable solid waste generated within the town be
processed at a facility built by a private contractor and operated by it for
56. See Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 466 (1981) (holding
that a regulation barring the use of plastic non-refillable milk containers was
constitutional, although all the producers of plastic resin are from out-of-state, while
pulpwood, which is the source of paperboard non-refillable milk containers is a major in-
state industry); EXXON Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 128 (1978)
(holding that a regulation prohibiting oil companies from also owning retail service
stations, which favors retail service stations, most of which are local, over oil companies,
all of which are interstate, was constitutional); Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S.
622, 640-41 (1951) (holding that a ban on door-to-door solicitation did not violate
negative aspect of the Commerce Clause when it was applied to prohibit door-to-door
solicitation for national magazines, since the effect of the ban was to favor local retail
merchants over magazine solicitors, both local and interstate).
57. Dep't of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 489 U.S. 803 (2008).
58. The first case to so hold was Philadelphia, 437 U.S. 617.
59. Chemical Waste Mgmt. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 342 (1992); Oregon Waste
System, Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality of Oregon, 511 U.S. 93, 99-100 (1994).
60. Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Mich. Dep't of Natural Res., 504 U.S. 353,
362-63 (1992).
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a five year period, after which the facility would be turned over to the
town.
61
In United Haulers Ass 'n v. Oneida-Herkimer,62 the Court again dealt
with a negative Commerce Clause challenge to a "flow control" law,
requiring that all solid waste in some counties be delivered to a facility
owned and operated by a county waste management authority. 63 The
Court was badly split. Four Justices, in an opinion by Chief Justice
Roberts, took the position that because the facility was owned by a
governmental body, there was no discrimination against interstate
commerce for negative Commerce Clause purposes, and so the law was
constitutional. 64 Two Justices took the position that there should be no
negative aspect to the Commerce Clause and so voted to uphold the
law.65 Three Justices took the position that the "flow control" law did
constitute discrimination for negative Commerce Clauses purposes, and
so was unconstitutional.
66
Once the Roberts plurality in United Haulers held that the law did
not constitute discrimination for negative Commerce Clause purposes, it
had no difficulty in finding that the law did not impose an undue burden
on interstate commerce, noting that, "any arguable burden [on interstate
commerce] does not exceed the public benefits of the ordinances. 67 The
plurality's dismissive treatment of the "undue burden" challenge is in
accord with the Court's institutional practice of dealing with this
component of the negative Commerce Clause. While some relatively
older cases invalidated particular non-discriminatory laws on "undue
burden" grounds,68 in more recent years, the Court has rejected the
61. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 390-91 (1994).
62. 550 U.S. 330 (2007).
63. Id. at 342.
64. Justices Souter, Ginsburg and Breyerjoined the Roberts opinion. Id. at 342-47.
65. Justices Scalia and Thomas. Id. at 348-55.
66. Justices Alito, Stevens, and Kennedy. Id. at 356-71.
67. Id. at 346. Justice Roberts contended that so long as the law was not
discriminatory for negative Commerce Clause purposes, the Court should not "rigorously
scrutinize" it, just as the Court would not "rigorously scrutinize" economic legislation
challenged on due process grounds. United Haulers, 550 U.S. at 347.
68. See Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520, 529-30 (1959) (state law
requiring that trucks be equipped with a specific kind of mudflap instead of a different
kind of mudflap that was permitted in virtually all other states and was required in a
neighboring state); Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 781-82 (state law
limiting the length of trains). In more recent cases where the Court invalidated state
regulations affecting interstate transportation on "undue burden" grounds, the invalidated
regulations also contained exemptions favoring local interests and so could have been
invalidated on discrimination grounds. See Kassell v. Consolidated Freightways, Corp.,
450 U.S. 662, 675-76(1981); Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 447-48
(1978). The "protectionism" effected by the regulations was a significant factor in the
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"undue burden" challenge to non-discriminatory regulation affecting
interstate commerce. The only exception to this practice has been with
respect to state regulation found to have an "extraterritorial effect" in that
it could control the conduct of entities engaged in interstate commerce in
another state. The Court has held that this kind of regulation is
unconstitutional as imposing an "undue burden" on interstate
commerce.
6 9
The constraints of the negative Commerce Clause do not apply when
the state is acting as a "market participant." Thus, when the state
purchases goods from suppliers or sells good produced at state-owned
facilities, it can give preference to its own residents. 70 However, once the
state disposes of a state-owned resource, the constraints of the negative
Commerce Clause do apply, and the state cannot impose conditions on
the purchaser of the resource that would require preferential access to
state residents or otherwise discriminate against interstate commerce or
out-of-state interests in favor of local commerce or in-state interests.71
We see then the primary restriction on state sovereignty imposed by
the Constitution is that the states cannot engage in discrimination against
interstate commerce or out-of-state interests in favor of local commerce
or in-state interests. They cannot impose regulations or adopt taxation
schemes that have this effect. 72 The law in this area is fairly well-settled,
and future litigation, as in United Haulers, is likely to resolve around the
question of whether the regulatory scheme is in fact discriminatory for
negative Commerce Clause purposes.
The non-discrimination principle also applies to state taxation of
interstate and foreign commerce. Constitutional limitations on the power
Court's "undue burden" analysis. See Kassell, 450 U.S. at 675-76; Raymond Motor
Transp., Inc., 434 U.S. at 447-48.
69. The cases have involved attempts to control wholesale prices at which alcoholic
beverages could be sold in the state by tying the in-state prices to the wholesale prices at
which the distiller sells the beverages in neighboring states. See Healy v. Beer Inst., Inc.,
491 U.S. 324, 336-37 (1989); Brown-Foreman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor
Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 582-83 (1986).
70. See Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 440 (1980) (resident preference for
cement produced by state-owned cement plant); Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426
U.S. 794, 805-06 (1976) (eligibility requirements for state subsidy for recycling
automobile hulks favoring state residents). See also White v. Mass. Council of Constr.
Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204, 214-15 (1982) (upholding against negative Commerce
Clause challenge a municipality's rule requiring that contractors on municipally-funded
projects employ at least fifty percent municipality residents in their work force).
71. See South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 87-88 (1984)
(requirement that purchaser of state owned timber must saw timber in state before
shipping it in interstate commerce violated negative Commerce Clause).
72. See id.
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of the states to tax interstate and foreign commerce derive from both the
negative aspect of the Commerce Clause and from the Fourteenth
Amendment's due process clause. In addition, Article I, Section 10 of the
Constitution prohibits the states, without the consent of Congress, from
taxing imports or exports.73 In Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady,74 the
Supreme Court adopted a combined negative Commerce Clause-due
process approach to the constitutional permissibility of such taxation,
now referred to as the "Complete Auto four-prong test., 75 This approach
is a pragmatic one, designed to take into account the realities of interstate
and international business operations and the legitimate needs of the
states to obtain revenue from multistate and multinational corporations
that do business within their borders.76 Under the Complete Auto test,
state taxation of interstate and foreign commerce is constitutionally
permissible if all of the following four elements are satisfied: (1) the tax
is applied to an activity having a substantial nexus with the taxing state;
(2) the tax is fairly apportioned to that activity; (3) the tax does not
discriminate against interstate or foreign commerce; and (4) the tax is
fairly related to services provided by the state.
77
It is only the third element of the test, the prohibition of
discrimination against interstate or foreign commerce, that is based on
federalism considerations rather than on the constitutional protection of
individual rights. What constitutes discriminatory taxation for negative
Commerce Clause purposes is determined by the same standard that is
used to determine when state regulation of interstate or foreign
commerce is impermissibly discriminatory, where a state taxation
73. The purpose of the import-export clause was to provide the federal government
with a reliable source of tax revenue by enabling it to tax imports and ensuring that this
source of revenue would not be eroded by overlapping state taxation. Michelin Tire Corp.
v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 285-86 (1976).
74. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
75. See, e.g., Quill Corp. v. N.D. By and Through Hetikamp, 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
76. See id.
77. In Michelin Tire Corp., 423 U.S. at 278-79, the Court held that the import-export
restriction prohibited only discriminatory state taxation. The import-export restriction
thus does not apply to prevent the states from imposing general taxes on goods produced
in the state, notwithstanding that the goods may be destined for foreign export, or to
impose general taxes on goods that have been imported into the state from a foreign
country. Id. Earlier cases holding that imports could not be taxed so long as they
remained in the "original package" were overruled in Michelin Tire. Id. at 296-300. Thus,
a state may impose its general property tax on imported goods to be used in the
importer's factory in the state. Limbach v. Hooven & Allison Co., 466 U.S. 353, 363
(1984). Likewise, it may impose a non-discriminatory ad valorem tax on imported
tobacco stored under bond in a customs warehouse and destined for domestic
manufacture and sale. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Durham County, N.C., 479 U.S.
130, 152 (1986).
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scheme, expressly or in practical operation, has the effect of
discriminating against interstate or foreign commerce or out-of-state
interests in favor of local commerce or in-state interests because of the
interstate or foreign nature of that commerce or the out-of-state nature or
foreign nature of those interests, it violates the negative aspect of the
Commerce Clause. The Court has invalidated a number of state taxation
schemes on this basis.78 However, as with state regulation affecting
interstate commerce, if the tax applies equally to in-state and out-state
consumers, it is not discriminatory, although most of the product is
shipped out-of-state. 79 On the other hand, where the tax is imposed on an
78. See South Central Bell Telephone Co. v. Alabama, 526 U.S. 160, 169 (1999)
(franchise tax based on corporation's capital, but allowing in-state corporation to pay tax
based on par value of stock, which can be set by corporation, while requiring out-of-state
corporation to pay tax based upon the value of the actual amount of capital it employs in
the state); Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 575-76
(1997) (property tax exemption for charitable institutions except for those operated
primarily for benefit of non-residents); Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 303-04
(1997) (sales and use taxes on natural gas purchases except for purchases from in-state
regulated utilities); Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 333-34 (1996) (intangibles
tax on value of corporate stock owned by state residents that was inversely proportional
to the amount of state income tax paid by the corporation, so that the larger the
percentage of a corporation's business conducted in the state, the smaller the amount of
the intangibles tax); Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 102
(1994) (per ton surcharge for disposal at site in state of waste generated out-of-state);
Assoc. Indus. of Mo. v. Lohman, 511 U.S. 641, 648-49 (1994) (local use tax on
out-of-state purchases by state residents that was higher than corresponding amount of
the intangibles tax); Kraft Gen. Foods, Inc. v. Iowa Dep't of Revenue, 505 U.S. 71, 79
(1992) (allowance of income tax credit to corporation for dividends received from
domestic subsidiaries, but not from foreign subsidiaries); New Energy Co. of Ind. v.
Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 274 (1986) (motor fuel tax credit for each gallon of fuel
containing ethanol, which was limited to ethanol produced in the state or in another state
that granted reciprocal tax credit for ethanol produced in taxing state); Bacchus Imports
v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 269 (1984) (exemption of certain locally produced beverages from
excise tax imposed on wholesale liquor sales); ARMCO, Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638,
642 (1984) (exemption of locally manufactured goods from gross receipts tax
notwithstanding that local manufacturers were subject to higher manufacturing tax);
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Tully, 466 U.S. 388, 403-04 (1984) (allowance of a
corporate tax credit on accumulated income of a subsidiary domestic international sales
corporation, but not on accumulated income of a subsidiary nondomestic international
sales corporation); Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 749-50 (1981) ("first use" tax
on natural gas brought into the state that contained various credits and exclusions, the
effect of which would be to encourage the use and production of natural gas in the state
rather than in other states); Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318, 330
(1977) (stock transfer tax which imposed a greater tax liability on out-of-state sales than
on in-state sales).
79. See Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609 (1981). There the state
had imposed a severance tax on all coal mined in the state, ninety percent of which was
shipped out of state. Id. at 617. Similarly, in the more recent case of American Trucking
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industry, such as the dairy industry, but the proceeds of the tax are
earmarked and used to provide a subsidy to local milk producers, the
combination of earmarking and subsidization of local industry constitutes
discrimination against interstate commerce and is unconstitutional.8 °
The Court's most recent decision dealing with discriminatory
taxation saw a divided Court upholding a state taxation structure that
exempted interest on bonds issued by the state and its subdivisions from
the state income tax, while taxing interest income on bonds from other
states and their subdivisions. 8' Justice Souter, joined on this point by
Justices Ginsburg, Breyer and Roberts, took the position that the state's
preference for state-issued governmental bonds involved a governmental
function and so did not violate the non-discrimination principle of the
negative Commerce Clause. 82 Justice Stevens, who dissented in United
Haulers, saw this case as involving a "pure" governmental function, and
so concurred in the result.83 Justices Scalia and Thomas took the same
position they did in United Haulers, to the effect that there should be no
negative aspect to the Commerce Clause and so voted to uphold the tax
preference.84 Justices Kennedy and Alito dissented.85
Where a state tax falls exclusively on foreign companies, there is the
concern that the state tax may constitute an improper interference with
federal power over foreign affairs. In Japan Lines, Ltd. v. Los Angeles
Ass 'n, Inc. v. Michigan Public Service Commission, 545 U.S. 429, 434 (2005), the Court
held that Michigan's imposition of a flat annual fee on all trucks hauling goods between
one point in Michigan and another could constitutionally be applied to trucking
companies engaged in interstate commerce.
80. West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 195-96 (1994) (tax on all sales
of milk by wholesalers to retailers, the proceeds of which funded a subsidy to local milk
producers). Although the Supreme Court has never dealt specifically with the issue, it has
been assumed that a state can constitutionally provide subsidies out of general revenues
to local businesses in order to promote business activity within the state. In West Lynn,
Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, stated: "We have never squarely confronted the
constitutionality of subsidies, and we need not do so now. We have, however, noted that
'direct subsidization of domestic industry does not ordinarily run' afoul of the negative
Commerce Clause." Id. at 199 n. 15 (internal citations omitted).
81. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1810-12.
82. Id. at 1819-20. On this point, Justice Souter saw the preference here as involving
a traditional governmental function in the same manner as the flow control ordinances
upheld in United Haulers. Id. at 1811. Chief Justice Roberts, who authored the opinion in
United Haulers, said that case was controlling here. Id. at 1821, 1819-20. Justice Souter,
joined on this point only by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, also contended that the
preference could be sustained on the "market participant" ground. Id. at 1811-17.
83. Id. at 1819-20.
84. Davis, 128 Sup. Ct. at 1821-22.
85. Id. at 1822.
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County,86 the Court held unconstitutional on negative Commerce Clause
grounds California's attempt to impose a property tax on the cargo
containers of Japanese companies that were used exclusively in
international trade and which were based, registered, and subject to full
value property taxes in Japan. 87 The Court discussed the "international
complications" that could result from state taxes on instrumentalities of
foreign commerce, and observed that such taxes could "impair federal
uniformity in an area in which federal uniformity is essential" and could
"prevent the federal government from 'speaking with one voice' in
international trade." 88 The Court also assumed that the tax, which was
non-discriminatory, would be constitutional in its application to
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, but went on to say that negative
Commerce Clause analysis operated differently where foreign commerce
was involved. 89 The Court noted that where foreign commerce was
involved, there was no "authoritative tribunal capable of ensuring that
the aggregation of taxes is computed on no more than one full value," so
that foreign commerce might be subjected to the risk of a double tax
burden to which domestic commerce was not exposed. 90 For these
reasons, I think that the case is better explained on the basis of improper
interference with the federal government's control over foreign affairs.
The Court's subsequent decision in Itel Containers International
Corp. v. Huddleston91 supports the improper interference with foreign
affairs basis of Japan Lines. In Itel, the Court upheld against negative
Commerce Clause and federal supremacy challenge a state's application
of its general sales tax to leases of containers owned by a domestic
company and used in international shipping. 92 It was significant that here
a domestic company was involved, that the state credited against the tax
any tax paid in another jurisdiction, foreign or domestic, and that the
United States filed an amicus brief, defending the application of the tax.
The decision in Japan Lines, as I have explained it, is an example of
another limited restriction on state sovereignty imposed by the
Constitution. State regulation affecting foreign commerce or other
foreign matters may be subject to constitutional challenge as an improper
interference with federal power over foreign affairs. A party is likely to
assert such a challenge where the state action is not inconsistent with a
86. 441 U.S. 434 (1979).
87. Id. at 453-54.
88. Id. at 448, 453.
89. Id. at 451-52.
90. Id. at 447-48.
91. 507 U.S. 60 (1992).
92. Id. at 76-78. The Court also rejected the company's argument that the imposition
of the tax violated container treaties into which the United States had entered. Id. at 75.
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federal treaty and is not preempted by federal law. The imposition of the
cargo tax on the containers of the Japanese companies in Japan Lines
could only be challenged on this basis, because there could be no claim
of a treaty violation or federal preemption.
The Court has held that federal power over foreign affairs dictates
that what is considered an "act of state" under federal law must be
recognized as such by state courts in litigation coming before them.
93
Likewise, state laws providing for the forfeiture of an alien heir's share
of a decedent's estate, where the alien heir's home state would not allow
American citizens reciprocal rights of inheritance, have been invalidated
by the Court as "an intrusion by the State into the field of foreign affairs
which the Constitution entrusts to the President and the Congress."94 In
two more recent cases, the Court again invoked this principle to
invalidate the challenged state laws. In Crosby v. National Foreign Trade
Council,95 the Court held that a Massachusetts law restricting the
authority of state agencies to purchase goods or services from companies
doing business with Myanmar was an unconstitutional interference with
the power of the federal government over foreign affairs and conflicted
with a federal law imposing sanctions on Myanmar. 96 And in American
Insurance Ass'n v. Garamendi,97 the Court held that a California law
requiring insurance companies doing business in the state to disclose
information about all insurance policies sold by the company or one
related to it in Europe between 1920 and 1945, interfered with the
President's efforts to resolve Holocaust-era insurance claims by
encouraging European governments and insurance companies to make
voluntary settlements.98
My discussion about constitutional limitations on state sovereignty
should make it clear that these limitations, while important, are precisely
defined, and do not undercut the overriding American federalism feature
of concurrent power nor the basic proposition that the states have plenary
power over all activity that takes place within their boundaries.
93. Bancio Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 436-37 (1964). In that case
the Court held that under the federal definition of the "act of state" doctrine, the Cuban
government's expropriation of American property in Cuba would be recognized, so that a
state court was compelled to recognize the validity of that expropriation in a suit in which
the effect of the expropriation was in issue. Id. at 439.
94. Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 432 (1968).
95. 530 U.S. 363 (2000)
96. Id. at 373-74.
97. 539 U.S. 396 (2003).
98. Id. at 419-20.
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III. THE POWERS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
While in constitutional theory the powers of the federal government
are only those enumerated in the Constitution, it has long been the case
that the Court, when construing those powers, particularly the power of
Congress over interstate and foreign commerce, has done so very
broadly. The result today is that, as a constitutional matter, virtually any
activity is subject to federal regulation. I will now proceed to analyze the
components of federal power.
99
At the outset, it should be noted that even within the concept of
enumerated powers, there are principles favoring the expansion of
federal power. First, it was long ago settled in the classic case of
McCulloch v. Maryland,00 that under the necessary and proper clause,
Congress can rely on a combination of powers to do something that is
not specifically authorized by any single power. In that case, the Court
held that although Congress was not specifically authorized in Article I,
Section 8, to charter a Bank of the United States, Congress had the
implied power to do so by putting together certain enumerated powers,
such as the power to tax and spend, the power to wage war, and the
power to regulate interstate and foreign commerce.' 0 ' Second, all of the
enumerated powers of Congress are independent powers that, interacting
with the necessary and proper clause, furnish the authority for whatever
action Congress takes under that power. 02 So, when Congress enters into
a treaty with a foreign country, the treaty power will support any law
executed to carry out the provisions of the treaty, regardless of whether
Congress would have the power to enact the law in the absence of the
treaty. 0 3 Likewise, under its war powers, Congress can deal with
domestic problems created by the war, such as the need for price
controls, and this power continues so long as the problem remains, even
99. 1 will do so from the perspective of determining the existence of federal power. In
the part of the Article dealing with issues involving the relationship between the federal
government and the states-what I would call true "states rights" issues-I will discuss
federal preemption, the regulation of the "states as states" by Congress, and the
constraints of the Eleventh Amendment.
100. 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
101. Id. at 353-54.
102. Id.
103. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433-34 (1920). Pursuant to a treaty with
Canada involving the protection of migratory birds, Congress enacted implementing
legislation. At that time it was questionable whether the Court would uphold the law as a
proper exercise of the commerce power, but since the law was tied to the treaty power, it
did not matter whether the legislation would be valid in the absence of the treaty. Id. at
432.
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though the war has ended. 104 And pursuant to its power over foreign
affairs, Congress may, either by the legislation itself or by authorization
of the President to do so, take action that directly affects domestic
matters.10 5 Finally, the question of the existence of federal power relates
to whether the power is granted to the federal government as a whole
rather than to a particular branch of the federal government. Thus, since
admiralty and jurisdiction is granted to the federal courts under Article
III, admiralty and maritime matters are within the power of the federal
government, and Congress has the power to legislate with respect to such
matters. 106 The Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments give
Congress the power to enforce the substantive provisions of those
amendments "by appropriate legislation." Similar authorization is
contained in the Nineteenth, Twenty-Third, Twenty-Fourth, and Twenty-
Sixth Amendments. Since the Thirteenth Amendment does not contain
any state action requirement, Congress may use its enforcement power
under section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment enforcement power to
prohibit racial and ethnic discrimination by private persons.
0 7
I will now consider the sweep of Congress' power over interstate and
foreign commerce. The two bases of the affirmative commerce power are
those of interstate movement and affecting interstate commerce. Under
the interstate movement basis of the commerce power, Congress has the
complete power to regulate the interstate movement of persons or things,
to follow the person or thing across state lines, and to regulate the
channels and instrumentalities of interstate commerce. Where interstate
104. See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944); Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co.,
333 U.S. 138 (1948).
105. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 678-79 (1981), where the President,
pursuant to Congressional authorization, entered into an agreement with Iran to secure
the release of American hostages. The agreement provided for the termination of all
litigation between the government of Iran and American nationals and for the settlement
of pending claims through binding arbitration before a tribunal established under the
agreement. Id. at 669. The agreement also nullified all prejudgment attachments against
Iran's assets in actions against Iran in American courts, and ordered transfer to Iran of all
of its assets in American banks except for one billion dollars to cover awards against Iran
by the claims tribunal. Id. at 670.
106. Panama R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375, 386-88 (1924). There the Court upheld
Congress' power to enact a law increasing the rights of injured seamen. Id. at 388. Based
on the grant of jurisdiction to the federal courts in admiralty cases, Congress has the
power to enact rules for admiralty and maritime cases and make those rules binding on
the states. See Ex parte Garnett, 141 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1891) (upholding Congressional
limitations on liability in admiralty cases).
107. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968); Griffin v. Breckenridge,
403 U.S. 88 (1971); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976); Saint Francis College v.
AI-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604 (1987); Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615
(1987).
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movement is involved, the commerce power thus serves as a national
police power. °0 The extent of Congress' power to regulate the channels
and instrumentalities of interstate commerce is illustrated by Pierce
County, Washington v. Guillen,0 9 where the Court upheld a federal law
protecting from discovery or introduction into evidence any reports or
data compiled and collected by state agencies to identify potential
accident sites or hazardous roadway conditions." 0
Under the affecting interstate commerce basis of the commerce
power, Congress can regulate all economic activity, no matter how
"local," on the premise that any local activity, when viewed
cumulatively, exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate
commerce."' In regard to economic activity then, Congress has the
plenary power to regulate the national economy.
The Court has never questioned Congress' plenary power under the
Commerce Clause to regulate all interstate movement and all economic
activity." 2 There is currently some controversy on the Court and among
108. A good example of the sweep of Congress' power under the interstate movement
basis of the commerce power is Barrett v. United States, 423 U.S. 212 (1976), which
upheld the power of Congress to make it unlawful for a person who has been convicted of
a felony to purchase a firearm that has moved in interstate commerce. Id. at 215-16.
Similarly, with respect to following the person or thing across state lines after interstate
commerce has come to an end, see United States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689 (1948)
(upholding Congress' power to require that a retailer display federally-mandated labels
on goods that have moved in interstate commerce, although the retailer purchased the
goods from an in-state wholesaler). A number of ordinary crimes, such as kidnapping and
auto theft, are made federal crimes when there has been a crossing of state lines in
connection with the crime. Some examples are: kidnapping, Lindbergh Act of 1932, 18
U.S.C. § 408a (1940) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (2000)); Gooch v. United
States, 297 U.S. 124 (1936); auto theft, Dwyer Act of 1919, 18 U.S.C. § 408 (1940)
(current version at 18 U.S.C. § 2312 (2000)); Brooks v. United States, 267 U.S. 432
(1936). Similarly, under the interstate movement basis of the commerce power, Congress
can exclude from interstate commerce any activity that it considers to be harmful. See
The Lottery Case, 188 U.S. 321, 356 (1903) (lotteries); Kentucky Whip & Collar Co. v.
Ill. Cent. R. Co., 299 U.S. 334, 345-46 (1937) (goods produced by prison inmates);
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 114 (1941) (goods produced under sub-standard
labor conditions).
109. 537 U.S. 129 (2003).
110. Id. at 147-48.
111. See, e.g., Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 155-56 (1971) (prohibiting
"extortionate extension of credit" in purely local activities because of dependence
nationally of organized crime on revenues derived from this activity); Hodel v. Va.
Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 298 (1981) (regulating surface
coal mining within each state); Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. II1, 127-28 (1942)
(regulating production of homegrown wheat used for feeding of livestock, since wheat
grown on a large number of farms for livestock feed could have a nationwide effect on
wheat prices).
112. Sedler, The Settled Nature, supra note 2, at 221.
THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW
academic commentators about the scope of the commerce power in the
situation where Congress uses the affecting interstate commerce basis of
the commerce power to regulate purely local non-economic activity, such
as the possession of firearms near a school,'1 3 or acts of domestic
violence occurring within a single state.' 14 Here, a majority of the Court
demanded that Congress demonstrate that in fact the activity in question
had a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce, 115 and in these
two cases, the Court has invalidated the challenged regulations as being
beyond the commerce power. 116
The situation where Congress attempts to use the commerce power
to regulate purely local non-economic activity would seem to be fairly
limited. Most laws enacted under the commerce power, either regulate
only economic activity, 117 or apply only to non-economic activity that
has crossed state lines.118 This being so, any limitation on the power of
Congress to regulate purely local non-economic activity under the
affecting interstate commerce basis of the commerce power would only
operate on the commerce power at the periphery and would not alter
significantly the sweeping nature of this power.
Moreover, the Court's latest decision involving the power of
Congress to regulate interstate commerce appears to limit the holdings of
the two earlier cases to little more than their particular facts. In Gonzales
v. Raich,"19 the Court held 6-3 that Congress had the power to apply the
Controlled Substances Act120 to prohibit the local cultivation and use of
marijuana for medical purposes, even though authorized by state law. 121
The opinion for the Court by Justice Stevens took a broad view of
113. See Lopez, 514 U.S. 549.
114. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 609.
115. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563; Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614.
116. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561; Morrison, 529 U.S. at 609.
117. It is on this basis that lower courts have upheld Congress' power to protect access
to local abortion clinics under the Access to Clinic Entrances Act, 18 U.S.C. § 248
(2000). See, e.g., United States v. Gregg, 226 F.3d 253 (3d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532
U.S. 971 (2001).
118. The criminal provision of the Violence Against Women Act, 18 U.S.C. §
2261(a)(1) (2000), punishes "interstate crimes of abuse including crimes committed
against spouses or intimate partners during interstate travel and crimes committed by
spouses or intimate partners who cross State lines to continue the abuse." See S. REP. No.
103-138, at 43 (1993). In Morrison, the Court noted that the Courts of Appeals have
"uniformly upheld th[e] criminal sanction as an appropriate exercise of Congress'
Commerce Clause authority" as "regulat[ing] the use of channels of interstate
commerce." Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613 n.5 (citing the cases collected in United States v.
Lankford, 196 F.3d 563, 571-72 (5th Cir. 1999)).
119. 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
120. 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-904 (2000).
121. Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 32, 33.
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"economic effect" for Commerce Clause purposes, saying that Congress
had a rational basis for concluding that leaving home-consumed
marijuana outside federal control would affect price and market
conditions and that high demand in the interstate market would draw
home-grown marijuana into that market.' 22 He also made the point that
where Congress is regulating a class of activities, such as marijuana use,
and the class of activities is within the reach of federal power, the Court
would not "excise individual components of that larger scheme."'123 In his
concurring opinion, Justice Scalia made the point that Congress has
regulatory authority over purely local activities that may not in
themselves substantially affect interstate commerce if those local
activities are "an essential part of a larger regulation of economic
activity, in which the regulatory scheme would be undercut unless the
intrastate activity were regulated."'' 24 In other words, according to Scalia,
since Congress could regulate the production and use of marijuana as a
whole, it could regulate any local use of marijuana without specifically
tying that local use to the national regulation of marijuana. The decision
in Gonzales v. Raich makes it clear that there will be virtually no
limitation on the otherwise plenary power of Congress to regulate
interstate commerce.
Congress also has broad powers under the taxing and spending
clause, 25 and may use the taxation and spending power to establish
social welfare programs and to accomplish regulatory objectives.
Pursuant to the taxing and spending power, Congress has established the
Social Security program126 and enacted a comprehensive system of
regulation of narcotic drugs. 127 Congress may also use the taxing and
122. See id. at 18-21.
123. See id. at 22. Since federal law prohibited the growing of marijuana for personal
use, including medical use, federal law controlled as a matter of federal supremacy, and it
did not matter that the use of marijuana for medical purposes was authorized by state law.
124. See id. at 36 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561).
125. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, el. 1. (granting Congress the power "[t]o lay and
collect Taxes, Duties, Imports and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the
commence Defence and general Welfare of the United States").
126. See Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 588-89 (1937); Helvering v.
Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937). Although Social Security has been politically marketed
as a form of social insurance, by which people pay in premiums and receive benefits
when they retire or become disabled, as a constitutional matter, Social Security is a tax
imposed on wage-earners and employers, the proceeds of which are used to pay social
welfare benefits. See discussion in Steward Mach. Co., 301 U.S. at 578-98. Social
Security does not operate on standard insurance principles, and there is no constitutional
entitlement to social security benefits. See Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47 (1977).
127. See United States v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 86, 93 (1919). The current use of the
taxation power to regulate narcotic drugs is contained in the Controlled Substances Act,
26 U.S.C.A. §§ 801-904 (West 2009).
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spending power to make it a crime to bribe a state or local official whose
government agency has received federal funds.128 And as we will see in
the next section, when Congress exercises the spending power, it may
impose requirements on the states as a condition for the receipt of federal
benefits that it could not impose on the states if it were acting as
regulator. 
29
We have demonstrated then that because the powers of the federal
government have been construed so broadly, today, as a constitutional
matter, virtually any activity is subject to federal regulation. At the same
time, because of the principle of state sovereignty, the fact that an
activity is subject to federal regulation does not as such preclude state
regulation of the same activity. State regulation of an activity is
precluded only when Congress has acted to preempt state regulation, and
as we will see in the next section, when dealing with preemption both
Congress and the courts have tried to strike a balance between the
principle of federal supremacy and the principle of state sovereignty,
with the result that federal preemption has not substantially altered the
concurrent power feature of the American federal system.
It is for this reason that issues as to the existence of federal power do
not as such raise "states rights" concerns. "States rights" concerns
involve congressional regulation of the "states as states," federal
preemption of state law, and federalism-based restrictions on state
power, such as those contained in the negative Commerce Clause. These
concerns relate to the relationship between the federal government and
the states, to which we now turn.
IV. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND THE
STATES
The relationship between the federal government and the states is the
most complex part of the American federal system. This is because the
relationship between the federal government and the states implicates
both the principle of state sovereignty and the principle of federal
supremacy and impacts significantly on the dominant American
federalism system's feature of concurrent power. Our discussion will
cover the following areas: (1) intergovernmental immunities, regulation
of the "states as states," and cooperative arrangements; (2) federal
preemption; and (3) federalism-based limitations on federal judicial
power.
128. See Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 605-06 (2004).
129. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987).
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A. Intergovernmental Immunities, Regulation of the "States as States,"
and Cooperative Arrangements
Because both the federal government and the states are sovereign in
the American constitutional system, it follows that the Constitution
imposes certain limits on the ability of each sovereign to interfere with
the operations of the other sovereign. However, the concept of
intergovernmental immunity operates in relation to the principle of
federal supremacy. What this means in the final analysis is that the states
cannot in any way interfere with the operations of the federal
government, but that the federal government may, to a very considerable
degree, apply its laws to the "states as states."
It has long been decided, going back to McCulloch v. Maryland,
130
that the states cannot impose a tax on any instrumentality of the federal
government, such as a federally-chartered bank,' 3 1 or otherwise directly
interfere with the operations of the federal government. 32 However,
principles of federal supremacy do not preclude the states from imposing
a non-discriminatory income tax on federal employees,' 33 nor do
considerations of state sovereignty preclude the federal government from
imposing a non-discriminatory income tax on state employees.'3 4 When
it comes to the imposition of federal taxes on activities operated by the
state governments, the constitutional situation is not as clear. It is not
disputed that the federal government could not constitutionally impose a
tax on state revenues or on an "instrumentality" of the state government.
However, state governments carry on a lot of activities, including some
of a proprietary nature that are no different from activities carried on by
private entities. The Supreme Court has upheld the imposition of a
federal excise tax on a state's sale of mineral waters bottled and sold by
the state to provide funds for a state health resort.' 35 The Court has also
130. 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
131. Id. at 330.
132. Id. at 322.
133. Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 486 (1938).
134. Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405, 419-20 (1938). The Court's decisions in this
area were codified in the Public Salary Tax Act of 1939, 4 U.S.C.A. § I 1l (West 2000).
See discussion in Jefferson County, Alabama v. Acker, 527 U.S. 423, 424-25 (1999). In
Davis v. Michigan Dep't of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 817 (1989), the Court held that a
Michigan taxation scheme that excluded the retirement pay of state and local
governmental employees, but not federal employees, violated the constitutional principle
of intergovernmental tax immunity and was not authorized by 4 U.S.C.A. § 11. In
Jefferson County, the Court held that an "occupational tax," calculated on a percentage of
the income of persons working within a county, was a nondiscriminatory tax that could
be levied on federal judges. Jefferson County, 527 U.S. at 443.
135. New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 575 (1946).
THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW
upheld the application to airplanes owned by a state police force of a
federal registration tax on all civil aircraft, imposed to defray the cost of
federal air navigational facilities and services, 3 6 For the most part,
however, Congress has not sought to apply federal tax law to activities
operated by the state governments, and it is recognized that the power of
Congress to do so is clearly subject to some constitutional limitations.
When it comes to the power of Congress to apply federal regulatory
laws to state and municipal governmental regulations, the Court, after
some going back and forth on this issue in the 1970s, has squarely held
that Congress may use the commerce power to "regulate the states as
states," and so, for example, can impose federal wage and hour
regulations on state and local governments. 37 In League of Cities and
Garcia, the Court had rejected the state's claim that the state activity in
question could not be regulated by Congress. 38 The only limitation on
Congress's power to "regulate the states as states" is that Congress may
not compel the states to regulate in a non-preemptable field in
accordance with federal standards. 139
B. Federal Preemption
As I have noted in an earlier piece, "[i]n practice, it is the matter of
federal preemption of state law that has the most potential for expanding
federal power over state power and altering the concurrent power feature
of the American federal system.' 40 Federal preemption necessarily
involves the interaction between the principle of federal supremacy and
the principle of state sovereignty. It is fair to say that both Congress, in
specifically dealing with preemption in the laws it enacts, and the Court,
136. Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 (1978).
137. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 555-56 (1985). As
to the imposition of other federal regulations on the states, see South Carolina v. Baker,
485 U.S. 505, 512-513 (1988); Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000). In Garcia, the
Court overruled National League of Cities Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 851 (1976) (invalidating
the application of these laws to state and local governments, and overruling the earlier
case of Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968)).
138. See, e.g., United Transportation. Union v. Long Island R.R., 455 U.S. 678, 685
(1982).
139. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992); Printz v. United States,
521 U.S. 898, 924 (1997). Congress may require the states to regulate in accordance with
federal standards as a condition to the continuance of state regulation in a preemptible
field. See Federal Energy Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 754-55 (1982); South
Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 526-27 (1988). Congress also has broad authority to
condition the grant of federal funds to the states on their compliance with federal policies.
See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987).
140. Sedler, The Settled Nature, supra note 2, at 225 (2002).
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when deciding questions of preemption, have tried to strike a balance
between these principles, with the result that federal preemption has not
substantially altered the concurrent power feature of the American
federal system. 141 A basic premise of preemption doctrine is that the
question is informed by "the assumption that the historic police powers
of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that
was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress."' 4 However, as we will
see, in a number of cases, the Court has found Congressional intent to
preempt the particular state law or regulation in question, but in a
number of other cases, it has found against preemption.
Congress may expressly deal with the matter of preemption in the
legislation itself. It may include a "savings clause," authorizing state
regulation that does not conflict with the federal law or authorizing the
states to impose even more extensive regulation than has been provided
under the federal law. 143 More typically, Congress establishes a standard
of preemption in the legislation. When Congress has done so, the courts
must apply that standard according to its terms in order to determine
whether a particular state law that affects the area in which Congress has
legislated has been preempted by the federal law.' 44 By far the largest
number of the preemption cases that arise in practice involve application
of the congressional standard of preemption to a particular state law. In
these cases, the Court applies the congressional standard very carefully
in an apparent effort to avoid preemption where it is possible to do so,
but at the same time, the Court does not hesitate to find preemption
where it is clearly called for under the congressional standard. We will
consider a number of examples.
A case that illustrates the Court's very careful application of the
federal standard of preemption is Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,
145
dealing with state tort law claims brought by cigarette smokers against
the tobacco companies. The Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of
141. Id.
142. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996).
143. See, for example, the "savings clause" contained in the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78bb(a) (West 2000) ("[N]othing in this chapter shall affect the
jurisdiction of the securities commission of any State over any security or any person
insofar as it does not conflict with the provisions of this chapter or the rules and
regulations thereunder."), and that contained in the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 2000-4 (West 1994) ("Nothing contained in any title of this Act shall be construed as
indicating an intent on the part of Congress to occupy the field in which any such title
operates to the exclusion of State laws on the same subject matter, nor shall any provision
of this Act be construed as invalidating any provision of State law unless such provision
is inconsistent with any of the purposes of this Act, or any provision thereof.").
144. Sedler, The Settled Nature, supra note 2, at 225.
145. 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
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1969146 imposed federal warning requirements on cigarette advertising,
and provided that "[n]o requirement or prohibition based on smoking and
health shall be imposed under State law with respect to the advertising or
promotion of any cigarette the packages of which are labeled in
conformity with the provisions of this Chapter."' 147 The plaintiffs in
Cipollone alleged a number of theories of liability. 148 The Court,
focusing on the operative language, "requirement or prohibition ... with
respect to . . . advertising or promotion," held that this provision
preempted state law claims based on a failure to adequately warn of the
dangers of smoking, 4 9 and those based on advertising that allegedly
"neutralized" the effect of the federally-mandated warning labels, 150 but
did not preempt claims based on breach of an express warranty' 5 1 or
claims based on intentional fraud or on a conspiracy theory.' 52 However,
when the State of Massachusetts tried to prevent cigarette advertising
directed at children by prohibiting any outdoor advertising of tobacco
products with a 1000 foot radius of any public playground, playground
area in a public park, elementary school or secondary school, and also
regulated advertising in retail stores selling cigarettes, the Court found
that Congress intended to preempt all state cigarette advertising
regulations motivated by concerns about smoking and health, including
those regulating only the location of the advertisement.' 
53
Sometimes, the federal standard of preemption is very broad, such as
the standard contained in the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974 (ERISA). 54 In this Act, Congress enacted a comprehensive
regulation of employee benefit plans, imposing participation, funding
and vesting requirements.' 55 As a part of this regulatory scheme,
Congress set out a broad standard of preemption, providing that, with
limited exceptions, ERISA "shall supersede any and all State laws
insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan
described [in the law].' 56 Applying this broad standard of preemption,
the Court has held that ERISA preempted a state common law rule that
146. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1331-40 (West 2000).
147. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1334(b) (West 2000).
148. Cipollone, 504 U.S. at 509.
149. Id. at 524.
150. Id. at 506.
151. Id. at 525-26.
152. Id. at 506.
153. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 547-48 (2001).
154. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1144(a) (West 2000).
155. Employee Retirement Income Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1001-1461 (West
2000).
156. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1444(a) (West 2000).
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would impose liability on an employer for discharging an employee in
order to prevent him from receiving benefits under a plan covered by
ERISA. 5 7 The Court has also held that ERISA preempted a provision of
a state community property law that allowed a spouse to make a
testamentary disposition of her interest in the other spouse's
undistributed pension benefits.' 58 Similarly, the Court has held that
ERISA preempted a state law providing for automatic revocation upon
divorce of any designation of the divorced spouse as beneficiary of an
asset that was not subject to probate,159 and that ERISA preempted a state
law allowing a suit for damages against a health maintenance
organization that provided benefits under an employer's health insurance
plan. 160 But even under this very broad standard, the Court held that
ERISA did not preempt a state law setting wage rates for apprentices
employed on public works projects, saying that Congress did not intend
to reach this area .161
There is an exception to ERISA preemption for state laws
"regulating insurance." The Court has held that a state's "notice
prejudice" rule, under which an insurer must show that it was prejudiced
by an untimely proof of claim in order to avoid liability, was a law
"regulating insurance" within the meaning of the ERISA exception, and
so was not preempted. 162 In the same case, however, the Court held that
another state rule allowing the employer to be deemed an agent in
administering a group insurance policy was a rule "relating to an
employee benefit plan" rather than a rule "regulating insurance," and so
was preempted. 63 The Court has also held that an Illinois law requiring
health maintenance organizations to provide an independent review of
disputes between the primary care physician and the health maintenance
organization and to cover services deemed medically necessary by the
independent reviewer was a law "regulating insurance" within the
meaning of the ERISA exception. 164
157. Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 140 (1990). To the same effect,
see District of Columbia v. Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125 (1993) (holding
that ERISA preempted a state law requiring employers who purchased health insurance
for their employees to provide equivalent health insurance coverage for injured
employees eligible for workers' compensation benefits).
158. Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 842-43 (1997).
159. Egelhoffv. Egelhoffex. RelBreiner, 532 U.S. 141, 148 (2001).
160. Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 214 (2004).
161. Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr. Co., 519 U.S.
316, 328, 334 (1997).
162. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of America v. Ward, 526 U.S. 358, 372-73 (1999).
163. Id. at 364.
164. Rush Prudential HMO v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 374-75 (2002).
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Another example of the Court's careful and balanced application of
the statutory standard of preemption is the Airline Deregulation Act of
1978,165 which prohibits the states from enforcing any law "related to a
price, route or service of an air carrier."' 66 The Court has held that this
provision preempted state regulation of allegedly deceptive airline fare
advertising through enforcement of general consumer protection laws
and restoration of frequent flyer claims under state consumer fraud
laws, 167 but did not preempt state laws allowing frequent flyer claims as a
matter of breach of contract. 1
68
Continuing with the Court's application of the statutory standard of
preemption in federal laws regulating transportation, Congress borrowed
the preemption provision of the Airline Deregulation Act for a 1994 law
deregulating trucking,' 69 and the Court recently held that this provision
preempted two provisions of a state law regulating the delivery of
tobacco within the state.' 70 The Court has held that federal regulations
establishing the terms under which states could use federal funds to
eliminate hazards at railroad grade crossings did not preempt state tort
law requirements regarding a railroad's duty to maintain warning devices
at railroad crossings.' 7' But in the same case, the Court held that federal
regulations regarding the maximum speeds at which trains were to
operate along certain types of tracks did preempt any tort claim against
the railroad for operating a train within those limits.' 72 In a similar case,
the Court held that where federal funds were used in the installation of
warning devices at railroad crossings, once those devices were installed,
the federal standard for adequacy of the warnings preempted state law. 
73
In other more recent preemption cases, the Court has held that the
preemption clause of the Federal Boat Safety Act,' 74 referring to "state
law or regulation," did not preempt state common law claims arising out
of the failure to install propeller guards on a boat engine,' 75 that a
provision of the federal Telecommunications Act preempting state laws
prohibiting the ability of "any entity to provide any interstate or intrastate
165. 49 U.S.C.A. § 40101 (West 1994 & Supp. 1999).
166. 49 U.S.C.A. § 41713(b) (West 1994).
167. Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383-84 (1992).
168. Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 228-29 (1995).
169. 49 U.S.C.A. § 14501(c)(1) (West 2009).
170. Rowe v. N.H. Motor Transp. Ass'n., 128 S.Ct. 989, 995-96 (2008).
171. CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 667-68 (1993).
172. Id. at 676.
173. Norfolk S. Ry. v. Shanklin, 529 U.S. 344, 352-53 (2000).
174. 46 U.S.C.A. § 4306 (West 2000).
175. Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 65 (2002).
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telecommunications services"'176 did not preempt a state law barring
political subdivisions of a state, such as municipalities, from providing
telecommunications services, 177 and that a provision of the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, providing that no state shall
"impose or continue in effect any requirements for labeling or packaging
in addition to or different from those required in this subchapter, 78 did
not preempt state law claims for defective design, defective manufacture,
negligent testing, and breach of express warranty brought by farmers
whose crops had been severely damaged by the application of a
pesticide. 79 However, the Court also held that a provision of the Federal
Clean Air Act prohibiting the adoption of any state or local standard
"relating to the control of emissions from new motor vehicles,"' 80 did
preempt state laws prohibiting the purchase by fleet operators of vehicles
that did not comply with the state's stricter emission requirements . 8'
A final example of the Court's careful application of the federal
standard of preemption is found in its 2008 decision in Riegel v.
Medtronic, Inc.,8 2 involving the preemption clause of the Medical
Device Amendments of 1976, which provides that
with respect to a device intended for human use, no state ... may
establish or continue in effect any requirement (1) which is
different from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable
under this chapter to the device, and (2) which relates to the
safety or effectiveness of the device or to any other matter
included in a requirement applicable to the device under this
chapter. 1
83
In the 1976 statute, Congress for the first time required federal Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) approval for medical devices. 14 The
statute provides for various levels of federal oversight, with the highest
provided for Class III devices, which include replacement heart valves,
implanted cerebella stimulators, and pacemaker pulse generators. 85 In
176. 47 U.S.C.A. § 253(a) (West 2000).
177. Nixon v. Mo. Mun. League, 541 U.S. 125, 138-40 (2004).
178. 7 U.S.C.A. § 136v(b) (West 2000).
179. Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 444 (2005).
180. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7543(a) (West 2000).
181. Engine Mfrs. Ass'n V. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. 246, 254-55
(2004).
182. 128 S. Ct. 999, 1011 (2008).
183. 21 U.S.C.A. § 360K(a) (West 2000).
184. Reigel, 128 S. Ct. at 1003-05.
185. Id.
THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW
the earlier case of Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr,186 the Court held that the
preemption provision of the Act did not preempt the state common law
rules imposing liability for defective medical device products that were
at issue in the particular case. In Riegel, the Court stated that in Lohr, it
had interpreted the preemption provision in a manner "substantially
informed" by the applicable FDA regulation, which provided that state
requirements were preempted "only when the Food and Drug
Administration ha[d] established specific counterpart regulations or there
are other specific requirements applicable to a particular device."'1 87 In
Lohr, the Court concluded that the FDA manufacturing and labeling
requirements were "applicable across the board to almost all medical
devices" and were not specific to the device in question."' As the
decision in Lohr was explained by the Court in Riegel, this was a major
factor in the Court's finding that the state common law rules were not
preempted.
In Riegel, in contrast, the FDA had given premarket approval to the
catheter in issue, and the process leading to premarket approval included
an evaluation of the device's safety and effectiveness under the
conditions of use set forth on the label, as well as a determination that the
proposed labeling was neither false nor misleading.1 89 Because of the
FDA preapproval of the device in question, the Court held that the
preemption provision operated to preempt state common law tort claims
imposing liability on the basis of a different standard than that used in
the FDA approval process. 190
Where Congress has not expressly dealt with the matter of
preemption, analytically the question becomes whether Congress
impliedly intended to preempt the state law in question. 91 Congress is
deemed to have impliedly intended to preempt state law whenever there
is a direct conflict between federal and state law in the sense that
compliance with both the state law and federal law is a physical
impossibility, or the state law stands as an obstacle to the implementation
of the full purposes of federal law. 192
The following are examples of the situation where the Court has
found preemption due to a direct conflict. A state law restricting the
authority of state entities to purchase goods or services from companies
186. 518 U.S. 470, 494 (1996).
187. See Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1006.
188. Id.
189. See id.
190. See id. at 1008.
191. Mich. Canners and Freezers Ass'n v. Agric. Mktg. and Bargaining Bd., 467 U.S.
461,469 (1984).
192. Id. (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
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doing business with Myanmar (Burma) conflicted with a federal law
dealing with the imposition of sanctions against that country.' 93 A state
tort suit alleging that a 1987 model automobile was defectively designed
because it lacked an airbag was preempted by a federal law that allowed
automobile manufacturers for the 1987 model year to select from several
passive restraint alternatives, of which airbags was only one, as a means
of complying with the federal standard. 94 Where a federal law providing
retirement benefits expressly provided that the benefits would not be
subject to legal attachment, a state could not apply its marital property
law to require that a share of these benefits go to the other spouse upon
divorce. 195  Where a federal regulatory agency authorized
federally-chartered savings and loan associations to include "due on
sale" provision in mortgages that they issued, that preempted state law
making such provisions unenforceable.'
96
The following are examples of the situation where the Court has
found preemption due to the fact that state law stands as an obstacle to
the implementation of the full purposes of federal law. A state law that
creates patent-like rights in property interferes with the operation of the
federal patent system and so is preempted. 97 A state law that attempts to
regulate a national-bank operating subsidiary interferes with the scheme
of regulation of federal banking law and so is preempted. 98 A state law
limiting the timing and takeoffs at airports was preempted by the fact that
under federal law, the Federal Aviation Agency has the responsibility to
ensure aircraft safety and the efficient utilization of airspace. 99 A state
law regulating labeling of packaged flour was preempted because it
would interfere with purposes of federal law regulating flour
packaging. 200 Federal laws regulating oil tankers preempt state laws
relating to oil tanker design, equipment and operating requirements,
because enforcement of the state requirements would frustrate the
congressional intention to establish a uniform federal law governing the
design and operation of all tankers.
20
'
The Court's most recent decision on implied preemption due to a
direct conflict between federal and state law, however, saw the Court
193. Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373-74 (2000).
194. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor, Inc., 529 U.S. 861, 875-76 (2000).
195. Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 590 (1979).
196. Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. de ]a Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 155 (1982).
197. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 153 (1989).
198. Watters v. Wachovia Bank, 550 U.S. 1, 12 (2007).
199. City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, 411 U.S. 624 (1973).
200. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 540-41 (1977).
201. United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 112-17 (2000).
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rejecting the claim of implied preemption.2 2 In Wyeth v. Levine, a state
court action was brought against a drug manufacturer alleging that the
manufacturer had failed to provide an adequate warning about the
significant risks of administering the drug by a certain method. 2 3 The
manufacturer asserted implied preemption on the ground that the drug's
labeling had been approved by the Federal Food and Drug
Administration (FDA). The state court rejected the claim of implied
preemption, and the Supreme Court affirmed. 204 The Court found that the
FDA approval of the drug's labeling would not have prevented the
manufacturer from adding a stronger warning about the risks of
administering the drug by this method, so that it was not impossible for
the manufacturer to comply with both the state law duties underlying the
claims and its federal labeling duties.20 5 The Court further found that
requiring the manufacturer to comply with the state law duty to provide a
stronger warning would not stand as an obstacle to the implementation of
federal law, because Congress had not expressly authorized the FDA to
preempt state law failure to warn actions.20 6 The decision indicates that
the Court will carefully scrutinize claims of implied preemption due to a
direct conflict between federal and state law, and will find implied
preemption only where it is fully satisfied that compliance with both the
state and federal law is a physical impossibility or that the state law
stands as an obstacle to the implementation of the full purposes of federal
law.
Where there is no direct conflict between state law and federal law,
the question becomes one of "implied field preemption," that is, whether
Congress intended to "occupy the field," so as to leave no room for state
202. See Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1200 (2009).
203. See id. at 119 1.
204. See id. at 1204.
200. See id. at 1199. In this regard the Court noted that it is a central premise of the Act
and FDA regulations that the manufacturer bears responsibility for the content of its label
at all times. Id. at 1197-98.
206. The Court stated, "If Congress thought state-law suits posed an obstacle to its
objectives, it surely would have enacted an express pre-emption provision at some point
during the FDCA's 70-year history." Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1200. The Court went on to
point out that in 1976 Congress had enacted an express pre-emption provision for
medical devices, which was the basis for the Court's decision in Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at
1008, but did not enact such a provision for prescription drugs. Id. The Court concluded:
"Its silence on the issue, coupled with its certain awareness of the prevalence of state tort
litigation, is powerful evidence that Congress did not intend FDA oversight to be the
exclusive means of ensuring drug safety and effectiveness." Id. Furthermore, since the
FDA had not issued a regulation establishing a specific labeling standard that left no
room for different state law judgments, the Court gave no weight to a preamble to a 2006
FDA regulation declaring that state law failure-to-warn requirements threatened the
FDA's statutorily-prescribed role. Id. at 1201-02.
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regulation at all even if the state regulation is not inconsistent with and
may actually supplement the federal regulation. It is here that the
principle of state sovereignty comes into play most strongly. Where the
matter in issue involves a field that the states have traditionally regulated,
the Court has stated that the presumption is against preemption, and that,
"[w]e start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the
States were not to be superseded . . . unless this was the clear and
manifest purpose of Congress." 20 7 In order for the Court to find implied
field preemption, there must be a "scheme of federal regulation so
pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room
for the states to supplement it."'20 8 This will occur only when (1) the
federal law "touche[s] a field in which the federal interest is so dominant
that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state
laws on the same subject," or (2) "the object sought to be obtained by the
federal law and the character of obligations imposed by it may reveal the
same purpose.,
20 9
The most significant factor leading to a finding of implied field
preemption is that of dominant federal interest. This is most likely to be
found where the federal law is based on a power other than the
commerce power, such as the power over immigration or the power over
national security. On this basis, the Court has held that the federal law
dealing with the registration of aliens preempts all state alien registration
laws,2 0 and that federal laws against sedition preempt all state laws in
this area.21 '
Once we get beyond matters where the federal government clearly
has the dominant interest, the Court is reluctant to find implied field
preemption. The Court focuses not only on the comprehensiveness of the
scheme of federal regulation, but also on whether the particular state
regulation would actually interfere with the objectives of the federal
regulatory scheme. Despite the comprehensiveness of a scheme of
federal regulation, the Court has typically found that the federal law was
not intended to preempt all elements of state regulation. For example, the
Court has held that while the comprehensive federal regulation of nuclear
energy preempts all state nuclear safety regulation, it does not preempt
207. Pac. Gas & Elc. Co. v. State Energry Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461
U.S. 190, 206 (1983).
208. Id. at 204.
209. Id.
210. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 72-74 (1941).
211. Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 504 (1956).
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the states from regulating the economic aspects of nuclear power,212 or
from allowing tort recovery of compensatory and punitive damages for
the harm caused by the escape of hazardous nuclear energy materials. 1 3
The Court has also held that the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle
Safety Act of 1966214 and implementing regulations did not preempt state
215common law tort claims against tractor-trailer manufacturers,  and that
federal law permitting seamen injured during the course of their
employment to bring their claims in state courts did not preempt state
law barring the application of the forum non conveniens doctrine in such
cases.
216
In a similar vein, while the Court has held that federal labor law
reflects a comprehensive scheme of federal regulation, and so preempts
state law with respect to questions of unfair labor practices and employee
rights that are within the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations
Board,21 7 matters that could alter the balance of power between labor
unions and employers, 21 8 and the interpretation and construction of
collective bargaining agreements, 21 9 there are a number of matters that
the Court has held were not preempted. The states may award damages
to an employee who was subject to a retaliatory discharge for filing a
workers' compensation claim,22 0 or for any wrongful discharge,22 1 or to a
member claiming damages for emotional harm caused by the union's
discrimination against him.222 The states may also require employers to
provide a one-time severance payment to employees in the event of a
223plant closing, and may grant unemployment compensation to striking
workers.
224
Where the federal scheme of regulation is less comprehensive, the
Court is correspondingly less likely to find any implied field
212. Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. at 215-16. Thus, California could refuse to license a nuclear
facility until the facility had a federally-approved plan for the permanent disposition of
high-level nuclear waste. Id. at 218-19.
213. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 258 (1984).
214. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1381 (repealed 1994).
215. Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 282-83 (1995).
216. Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443,455-57 (1994).
217. See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Gannon, 359 U.S. 236, 244-46 (1959).
218. See Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL CIO v.
Wis. Emp. Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132, 148-49 (1976).
219. See Linge v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 407-13 (1988).
220. Id. at 401.
221. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 248 (1994).
222. Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners, 430 U.S. 290, 302 (1977).
223. Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 3-4 (1987).
224. N.Y. Tel. Co. v. New York State Dep't of Labor, 440 U.S. 519, 544 (1979).
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preemption. 225 This is especially true where the federal government has
not regulated the particular activity, so that a finding of preemption
226
would leave a regulatory vacuum. The Court is also not disposed to
find implied field regulation where the challenged state regulation
supplements the federal regulation and does not interfere with its
operation.
2 27
Federal preemption is a very significant component of the American
federal system, and it provides an effective basis for challenging state
laws regulating interstate commerce. However, while federal preemption
has the most potential for expanding federal power over state power, this
has not happened in practice. Both Congress and the Court have tried to
strike a balance between the principle of federal supremacy and the
principle of state sovereignty. The Court's holdings in preemption cases
over the years provide sufficient guidelines for the resolution of many of
the preemption questions that arise in actual cases, and the numerous
cases presenting preemption questions will be determined in accordance
with these guidelines.
C. Federalism-Based Limitations on Federal Judicial Power
The Constitution and federal law impose certain federalism-based
limitations on the exercise of federal judicial power.
225. See, e.g., Itel Containers Int'l Corp. v. Huddleston, 507 U.S. 60, 70-71 (1993),
where the Court held that a federal treaty permitting foreign cargo containers to enter the
United States "free of import duties and taxes," referred only to customs duties, and was
not intended to occupy the field of container regulation and taxation. This being so, the
treaty did not preempt the states from imposing a tax on the income derived from leasing
the containers within the state. Id. at 71.
226. See Maurer v. Hamilton, 309 U.S. 598, 603-04 (1940) (where the Interstate
Commerce Commission had not promulgated regulations dealing with carrying of
automobiles over the cab of the automobile transportation vehicle, although it had the
authority to do so, state regulation prohibiting this practice was not preempted); Arkansas
Elec. Coop. Corp. v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 375, 388-89 (1983) (where
federal agencies having jurisdiction over the matter had not regulated rates charged by a
rural electric cooperative to local members, state regulation of such rates was not
preempted by federal law).
227. For illustrative cases, see California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 735-38 (1949)
(holding that state prohibition of transportation not licensed by Federal Interstate
Commerce Commission not preempted); Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm'n v.
Continental Air Lines, 372 U.S. 714, 722-24 (1963) (holding that state application of
employment discrimination law to federally regulated air carrier not preempted);
California Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572, 593-94 (1987) (holding
that state requirement that mining company apply for state permit not preempted as
applied to company that was mining in national forest pursuant to permit granted by
federal agency).
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1. The Eleventh Amendment
The limitation imposed by the Constitution is found in the Eleventh
Amendment. While the Eleventh Amendment, by its terms, is addressed
to the jurisdiction of the federal courts, and refers only to a suit against a
state by a citizen of another state or a foreign country,228 it has long been
interpreted to extend to suits brought against a state by its own
citizens.229 More recently it has been interpreted as prohibiting Congress
from abolishing state sovereign immunity in suits by private persons
against the states.230 The Court has held that rather than break new
ground, the Eleventh Amendment is a confirmation of the proposition
that the states' sovereign immunity derives from the structure of the
Constitution itself.23 As the Court has stated: "[ilt follows that the scope
of the States' immunity from suit is demarcated not by the text of the
Amendment alone, but by fundamental postulates implicit in the
constitutional design." 232 Thus, the Eleventh Amendment constrains
Congress from abolishing a state's sovereign immunity from suits by
private persons to enforce federal statutory rights whether in federal
court or in state court.233 Applying current Eleventh Amendment
doctrine, the Court has held that a number of federal laws authorizing
private entities to sue the state were violative of the Eleventh
Amendment. These include the following: a federal statute authorizing a
federal court suit by a private entity to compel a state to comply with a
duty imposed by federal law;234 a federal law interpreted as authorizing
suit by a private entity against a state for trademark violation and another
federal law abrogating state sovereign immunity in suits by private
228. The Eleventh Amendment provides: "The Judicial Power of the United States
shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by citizens of another State or by citizens of subjects of
any foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
229. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). The Eleventh Amendment only applies
to suits against the state itself or agencies of state government, and does not apply to suits
against subordinate units of state government, such as cities or school districts. Alden v.
Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 756-57 (1994). The Supreme Court has also held that the Eleventh
Amendment did not apply to a suit against a railroad owned by the Port Authority of New
York, an independent entity created by a bistate compact between the states of New York
and New Jersey Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 39 (1994).
230. Alden, 527 U.S. at 732-33.
231. Id. at 728.
232. Id. at 729.
233. Id. at 747-48.
234. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 75-76 (1996). In this case, the
Court overruled its prior decision in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 23
(1989), that held that Congress had the authority under the commerce power to abrogate
state sovereign immunity.
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entities for patent infringement claims;235 a federal law subjecting states
to suit in state court for claims under the federal Wages and Hours
law; 236 application of the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act
to suits by state employees against state agencies; 237 application of Title I
of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, prohibiting employment
discrimination against persons with disabilities, 238 to suits by state
employees against state agencies.239
The Court, however, has made two exceptions to the Eleventh
Amendment immunity of the states, both grounded in the Fourteenth
Amendment. First, the Court has held that since the Fourteenth
Amendment was enacted after the Eleventh Amendment, it supersedes
the Eleventh Amendment where Congress has acted pursuant to its
enforcement powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to
authorize an award of damages against the state for violation of a
person's federal constitutional rights.24 ° In the exercise of its Section 5
enforcement powers, Congress may do more than proscribe conduct that
the Court has held unconstitutional. Congress has the power both to
remedy and to deter the violation of constitutional rights, and may do so
by enacting prophylactic legislation that proscribes facially constitutional
conduct. When Congress exercises its Section 5 powers for this purpose,
the legislation must be an appropriate remedy for identified
constitutional violations by the states, and the legislation must exhibit
congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or
remedied and the means adapted to that end. 24 1 Applying this test, the
Court has held that Congress could abolish state sovereign immunity in a
suit under the Family and Medical Leave Act, 242 in light of the states'
record of unconstitutional participation in, and fostering of, gender-based
235. Coll. Sav. Banks v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666,
691 (1999).
236. Alden, 527 U.S. at 712.
237. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 91-92 (2000).
238. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12131 (West 2009).
239. See Bd. ofTrustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001). See also Fed.
Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 747 (2002), where the Court held that
the Eleventh Amendment prevents a federal administrative agency, here the Federal
Maritime Commission, from adjudicating a cruise ship's complaint that the state port
authority violated federal law by denying the cruise ship permission to berth at the
agency's port facilities.
240. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 447 (1976) (awarding of damages and
attorneys fees in action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to redress violation of federal
constitutional rights, here racial discrimination in employment).
241. See the discussion in Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S.
721, 727-28 (2003).
242. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2601 (West 2009).
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discrimination in the administration of leave benefits. 243 The Court has
also held that Congress could abolish state sovereign immunity in a suit
under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990,244
prohibiting discrimination against persons with disabilities with respect
to the provision of public services and access to public facilities, in a suit
by paraplegics who contended that they were denied access to state
courts that were not wheelchair accessible.245
Second, the Court held many years ago in Ex parte Young 246 that a
suit brought against state officials, such as the state attorney-general, to
prevent a violation of federal constitutional rights, in which the plaintiffs
sought only prospective injunctive relief, was not a suit against the state
for Eleventh Amendment purposes, although the action of the state
officer would otherwise qualify as state action for Fourteenth
Amendment purposes. The Court has also applied the Ex parte Young
principle to allow a suit against state officials to enjoin an action taken in
violation of federal law.247 As a practical matter, the Eleventh
Amendment does not prevent federal court judicial review of the
constitutionality of state laws or governmental action or the violation of
federal laws by state officials. 248 Rather, the essential effect of the
Eleventh Amendment is to prohibit Congress from abrogating the states'
sovereign immunity in suits by private entities for damages or monetary
relief against the state or state officers in their official capacity. 249 It is
thus a specific and narrow, limitation on Congressional power, grounded
in considerations of state sovereignty.
243. Nev. Dept. of Human Res., 538 U.S. at 730.
244. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12132 (West 2009).
245. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004). The Court held that the fact that the
courthouses were not wheelchair-accessible violated the paraplegic person's due process
right to access to courts, and that Congress could find that in many states across the
country, many individuals were being excluded from courthouses and court proceedings
by reason of their disabilities. Id at 532-33. Whereas in Garrett, the Court held that
Congress did not have a valid basis for concluding that there had been a long history of
discrimination against persons with disabilities in state employment. Garrett, 531 U.S. at
368-72.
246. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
247. Verizon Maryland, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 535 U.S. 635, 645-48 (2002). The
holding of Ex parte Young also applies to federal court enforcement of a consent decree
entered into by state officials in an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Frew v. Hawkins, 540
U.S. 431, 436-37 (2004).
248. Exparte Young, 209 U.S. at 167-68.
249. For earlier cases barring actions for monetary relief against state officials see, for
example: Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 678 (1974) (holding that federal courts
cannot order state officials to pay illegally withheld welfare payments); Green v.
Mansour, 474 U.S. 64 (1985) (federal courts cannot require state to issue notices to
persons that welfare payments were illegally withheld).
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2. Limitations on Federal Court Jurisdiction
Congress and the Supreme Court have also imposed certain
federalism-based limitations on federal court jurisdiction. These
federalism-based limitations relate to the fact that in the American
constitutional structure there is a dual system of federal and state courts,
with a substantial degree of overlapping jurisdiction,2 50 and that the state
court system represents a very important element of state sovereignty.
The most important of these limitations is the Anti-Suit Injunction
Act, which provides that, "[a] court of the United States may not grant an
injunction to stay proceedings in a state court except as expressly
authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its
jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgment.,2 51 The Act traces
back to 1793, and is designed to "balance the tensions inherent in a dual
system of courts." 252 The Court has stated that the Act is "an absolute
250. In retrospect, the substantial degree of overlapping jurisdiction between federal
and state courts results from the fact that under the Supremacy Clause, U.S. CONST. art.
VI, § 2, the state courts are required to apply the Constitution and federal laws and
treaties in cases coming before them. Furthermore, under U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2,
and implementing legislation, the federal courts are given diversity jurisdiction in suits
between citizens of different states and suits between a state citizen and a foreigner. See,
e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The overlapping jurisdiction was increased by the provisions of
the Reconstruction and other Amendments, protecting individual rights against state
governmental action, and implementing legislation, such as 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which
created a federal cause of action to protect those rights.
251. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2283 (West 2009).
252. Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 486 U.S. 140, 146 (1988). In tracing the history
of the Act, the Court has observed as follows:
When this Nation was established by the Constitution, each State surrendered
only a part of its sovereign power to the national government. But those powers
that were not surrendered were retained by the States and unless a State was
restrained by 'the supreme Law of the Land,' as expressed in the Constitution,
laws or treaties of the United States, it was free to exercise those retained
powers as it saw fit. One of the reserved powers was the maintenance of state
judicial systems for the decision of legal controversies. Many of the Framers of
the Constitution felt that separate federal courts were unnecessary and that the
state courts could be entrusted to protect both state and federal rights. Others
felt that a complete system of federal courts to take care of federal legal
problems should be provided for in the Constitution itself. The dispute resulted
in compromise. One 'supreme Court' was created by the Constitution, and
Congress was given the power to create other federal courts. ... Thus from the
beginning we have had in this country two essentially separate legal systems.
Each system proceeds independently of the other with ultimate review in this
Court of the federal questions raised in either system. Understandably this dual
court system was bound to lead to conflicts and frictions .... Obviously this
dual system could not function if state and federal courts were free to fight each
other for control of a particular case. Thus, in order to make the dual system
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prohibition against enjoining state court proceedings unless the
injunction falls within one of the three specifically defined
exceptions. 253
In applying the Act the Court has held that a federal court cannot
enjoin a state court from issuing an injunction against peaceful picketing
in connection with a labor dispute, despite the claim that Congress had
preempted the field and that the matter came within the jurisdiction of
the National Labor Relations Board. 4 Likewise, a federal court cannot
issue an injunction against a state court judgment on the ground that the
underlying action had an anti-competitive purpose and violated federal
antitrust laws.
255
The Act does not apply when suit to enjoin enforcement of a state
court judgment is brought by the United States or by a federal agency,
such as the National Labor Relations Board.256 It also does not apply
when the injunction is not against enforcement of a state court judgment,
such as when an injunction is issued against enforcement of a
garnishment obtained by a private person pursuant to state law, 257 or
against a recount by state election officials.
258
With respect to the "expressly authorized" exception, the Court,
looking to the broad remedial purpose of the Civil Rights Act of 1871,259
has held that it is a statutorily authorized exception to Section 2283, so
that a federal court may issue an injunction against a state court
proceeding that violates federal constitutional rights.2 60 However, under
the Supreme Court's Younger doctrine, which we will discuss shortly,
the federal courts generally cannot exercise jurisdiction to interfere with
pending state court criminal or civil proceedings, so the Section 2283
work and 'to prevent needless friction between state and federal courts,' it was
necessary to work out lines of demarcation between the two systems.... The
1793 anti-injunction act was at least in part a response to those pressures.
Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Engineers, 398 U.S. 281, 285-86
(1970) (internal citations omitted).
253. Id. at 286.
254. Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Richman Bros., 348 U.S. 511, 519-21 (1955).
255. Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623 (1977). The Court there held that
the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, was not an expressly authorized exception to 28 U.S.C. §
2283.
256. See Leiter Minerals v. United States, 352 U.S. 220, 224-25 (1957); N.L.R.B. v.
Nash-Finch Co., 404 U.S. 138, 144 (1971).
257. Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 554-56 (1972).
258. Roudebush v. Hartke, 405 U.S. 15, 21-23 (1972).
259. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West 1996).
260. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242-43 (1972).
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exception is somewhat limited. Only a few federal statutes have been
held to come within the "expressly authorized" exception.2 6'
The more difficult cases involve the "in aid of its jurisdiction" and
"protect or effectuate its judgments" exception. The "in aid of its
jurisdiction" exception only applies where the later state court action
involves property in the custody of a federal court. Where separate suits
are brought in federal and state courts, and both are pending, Section
2283 precludes the federal court from issuing an injunction against the
pending state court proceeding. 262 The "relitigation" exception is founded
on the well-recognized principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel,
and "is designed to permit a federal court to prevent state court
relitigation of an issue that previously was presented to and decided by a
federal court. 2 6 3 It is clearly applicable where a federal court suit had
terminated in a final judgment, and the later state court suit was brought
for the purpose of relitigating issues finally adjudicated by the federal
court. 264 This exception does not apply, however, in a case where the
state court judgment decided an issue that was not decided in the prior
federal court action, and in that circumstance, Section 2283 precludes the
federal court from issuing an injunction against enforcement of the state
court judgment.265 Chick Kam Choo involved a claim for the wrongful
death of a Singapore resident killed in Singapore while performing repair
266
work on a ship owned by an American company in Singapore. The
federal court held that Singapore law applied on the choice of law
question and rendered judgment for the defendant on the plaintiffs
federal law claims. 267 The court also dismissed the rest of the case on
261. These statutes are set out and the matter discussed more fully in CHARLES A.
WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF THE FEDERAL COURTS 303-04 (6th ed. 2002).
262. See Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 235 (1922) and the discussion in
WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 260, at 304-05.
263. Chick Kam Choo, 486 U.S. at 147.
264. See, e.g., Bethke v. Grayuburg Oil Co., 89 F.2d 536, 539 (5th Cir. 1937).
265. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 398 U.S. at 296-97. In that case, a federal court
refused to enjoin a union from picketing a railroad on the ground that the picketing was
not prohibited by federal law. Id. at 283. The railroad then went into state court, where
the injunction was granted pursuant to state law. Id. Following a United States Supreme
Court decision holding that federal law prohibited state courts from issuing injunctions
such as the one the railroad had obtained, the union moved in the state court to dissolve
the injunction, but the state court refused to do so. Id. at 284. The union then returned to
federal court and sought an injunction against enforcement of the state court injunction.
Id. The Supreme Court held that the issuance of a federal court injunction was barred by
Section 2283, even assuming that the state court injunction was erroneous, since the prior
federal court suit did not decide the question of whether federal law precluded the
issuance of an injunction based on state law. Id. at 296-97.
266. Chick Kam Choo, 486 U.S. at 140.
267. Id. at 143.
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forum non conveniens grounds. 268 The plaintiffs then brought a suit in a
Texas state court seeking to recover on a claim under Texas law. 269 The
Texas court refused to dismiss the suit on forum non conveniens
grounds. 270 The defendant then returned to federal court and sought an
injunction against the continuation of the Texas court suit.271 The
Supreme Court held that since the Texas law of forum non conveniens
differed from the federal law of forum non conveniens, the federal
court's decision did not resolve that issue, and the federal court could not
enjoin continuation of the state court proceedings.272 However, since the
federal court had determined that as a matter of choice of law, Singapore
law governed the substantive claims, Singapore law had to apply in the
state court suit, and the federal court could issue an injunction precluding
relitigation of that issue.273 On the other hand, the fact that a state court
has held that a state law is constitutional does not bring into play Section
2283, so as to bar a party who was a "stranger" to the prior state court
proceeding from bringing a subsequent federal suit to obtain an
injunction against enforcement of the state law. 274
In addition to the Anti-Suit Injunction Act, Congress has enacted two
laws that prohibit the federal courts from interfering with particular state
governmental actions. The Johnson Act of 1934275 prohibits the federal
courts from enjoining the operation of any order of a state administrative
agency or ratemaking body affecting rates charged by a public utility,
where (1) the order does not interfere with interstate commerce, (2) the
order was made after reasonable notice and hearing, and (3) there is be a
"plain, speedy and efficient remedy" in the state courts to challenge the
validity of the order.276 The effect of the Johnson Act is to channel
normal utility rate litigation into the state courts, while leaving the
federal courts free to enjoin ratemaking orders that interfere with
interstate commerce or that are procedurally unfair.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 144.
272. Chick Cam Choo, 486 U.S. at 148-49.
273. Id. at 149-50.
274. Hale v. Bimco Trading, 306 U.S. 375, 377-78 (1939); County of Imperial,
California v. Munoz, 449 U.S. 54, 59-60 (1980).
275. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1342 (West 2009).
276. Where a subsequently enacted federal law preempts the state ratemaking law, the
federal courts can enjoin the operation of the state ratemaking law. Public Utilities
Comm'n v. United Fuel Gas. Co., 317 U.S. 456, 468-70 (1943).
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The Tax Injunction Act277 similarly prohibits the federal courts from
enjoining the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under state law
when a "plain, speedy and efficient remedy" is available in the state
courts. 2 78 Again, the purpose of the Act is to channel litigation over the
validity of state taxes into the state courts, provided that state law
provides an adequate remedy to challenge the tax.2 79 Neither the Johnson
Act nor the Tax Injunction Act applies to a suit brought by the United
States.28°
These statutes reflect Congressional recognition of the importance of
state sovereignty in the American constitutional system. In interpreting
the Tax Injunction Act, for example, as a "broad jurisdictional barrier" to
federal court interference with the states' administration of their taxing
systems, the Supreme Court has noted that, "[t]he federal balance is well
served when the several States define and elaborate their own laws
through their own courts and administrative processes and without undue
interference from the federal judiciary," and that "[t]he power to tax is
basic to the power of the State to exist.' ,28' Again, recall that in the
American constitutional system the states succeeded to the sovereignty
over domestic matters formerly exercised by the British Crown and
possess the general regulatory and taxation power.282 Congress has made
the policy choice to channel litigation over state taxation into the state
courts with possible review of constitutional questions in the United
States Supreme Court.283 However, when the United States is a party, the
federal balance changes, and the federal government's assertion of its
277. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1341 (West 2009).
278. In Georgia R.R. & Banking Co. v. Redwine, 342 U.S. 299, 323-24 (1952), the
Court held that the state court remedy to challenge the tax assessment was inadequate
when the taxpayer would have had to file over three hundred separate claims in fourteen
different counties.
279. The Act also applies to a federal court declaratory judgment action. California v.
Grace Brethern Church, 457 U.S. 393, 417 (1982).
280. See Dep't of Empl. v. United States, 385 U.S. 355, 358 (1966). In Arkansas v.
Farm Credit Services of Central Arkansas, 520 U.S. 821, 831-32 (1997), the Court held
that for these purposes a suit by a federally-chartered production credit association was
not a suit by the United States, so that a suit by such an association to enjoin the
operation of a state tax was barred by the Act. Indian Tribes are also not exempt from the
provisions of the Act as such, but are in effect exempt, because another federal law, 28
U.S.C. § 1362 provides for sweeping federal court jurisdiction where an Indian Tribe is a
party. Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463, 472-75 (1976).
281. Farm Credit Servs., 520 U.S. at 826.
282. Sedler, The Settled Nature, supra note 2, at 220.
283. See, e.g., Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Comm'n, 488 U.S. 336, 346
(1989), where the Supreme Court held that a state property tax assessment that was
upheld by the state courts violated equal protection.
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own sovereign power to tax justifies federal court jurisdiction to protect
the federal government from improper state taxation.284
The Supreme Court has also imposed federalism-based limitations
on federal court jurisdiction by means of various abstention doctrines. A
detailed discussion of the various abstention doctrines imposed by the
Supreme Court is beyond the scope of the present article. Rather, we will
present an overview of the doctrines as they relate to the structure of the
American federal system and the operation of dual state and federal
courts. As the Supreme Court has explained, these doctrines "reflect a
complex of considerations designed to soften the tensions inherent in a
system that contemplates parallel judicial processes." 285
The Pullman abstention doctrine 286 provides that when an unsettled
question of state law is presented in a case involving a federal
constitutional challenge to a state law or governmental action, and the
resolution of the state law question may avoid or modify the resolution of
the federal constitutional question, the federal court must abstain from
deciding the federal constitutional question until the parties have repaired
to the state courts and have obtained an authoritative determination of the
28state law question. 87 Pullman abstention thus is a postponement not a
relinquishment of federal court jurisdiction, and after the parties have
obtained the authoritative determination of the state law question, they
return to the federal court and litigate the federal constitutional question
in light of the state court's determination of the state law question.288
284. See the discussion in Farm Credit Servs., 520 U.S. at 827-28.
285. Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 12 n.9 (1987).
286. Named after Railroad Comm'n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
287. Id. at 500. In Pullman, the federal plaintiff challenged an order of the Texas
Railroad Commission, contending that Texas law did not give the Commission the
authority to issue the order, and further that if the Commission did have the authority to
issue the order, the order violated the plaintiffs Fourteenth Amendment due process
rights. Id. at 498. If the state court would hold that the Commission did not have the
authority to issue the order, there would be no need for the federal court to decide the
federal constitutional question. Id. at 499. The test for Pullman abstention is whether the
state law at issue is "fairly subject to an interpretation which will render unnecessary or
substantially modify the federal constitutional question." Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S.
528, 535 (1965). Abstention is proper if the claim is that the state law may violate a
specialized state constitutional provision, but not if "the state constitutional provision is
the mirror of the federal one." Harris County Commr's Court v. Moore, 420 U.S. 77
(1975) (holding that abstention is proper with respect to state constitutional provision
relating to the removal of members of the minor judiciary).
288. However, if the federal plaintiff chooses to litigate the federal constitutional
question in the proceedings before the state court, the state court determination of that
question is binding on the litigants, and it may not be re-litigated in the federal court
proceeding. England v. La. State Bd. Med. Exam'rs, 375 U.S. 411,418-19 (1964).
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The Burford abstention doctrine 289 mandates federal court dismissal
of an action that would interfere with proceedings or orders of state
administrative agencies with respect to a specialized aspect of a
complicated regulatory system, which is better left to the state
administrative agencies and the state courts. 2 90 Burford abstention is
limited to the situation where timely and adequate state court review is
available, and there are either "difficult questions of state law bearing on
policy problems of substantial public import whose importance
transcends the result in the case at bar," or "the exercise of federal review
of the question in a case or similar cases would be disruptive of state
efforts to establish a coherent policy with respect to a matter of
substantial public concern.",291 As this definition of Burford abstention
makes clear, there will be relatively few cases in which Burford
abstention is proper.
The most prevalent form of federal abstention is Younger
abstention,292 which mandates that a federal court may not grant
injunctive or declaratory relief against the enforcement of a state law or
governmental action that is being enforced against the federal plaintiff in
a pending state court proceeding. Younger abstention is based on
considerations of "equity, comity, and federalism," and requires
dismissal of the federal action on the grounds that (1) the federal plaintiff
has an adequate remedy to assert his federal constitutional rights by way
of defense to the pending state court proceeding,29 3 (2) that interference
with the pending state court proceeding would prevent the states from
advancing an important state interest, and (3) that the federal courts
289. Named after Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
290. Burford involved proration orders in Texas oil fields, and the Court held that the
federal court should abstain from hearing the case. Burford, 319 U.S. at 334.
291. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 361
(1989). In that case the Court held that Burford Abstention was improper where a utility
challenged a city's order denying it a refund of charges was preempted by federal law. Id.
The Court noted that in that case there was no unsettled question of state law and that
federal intervention would not amount to disruption of efforts to establish a coherent
ratemaking policy. Id. at 372-73.
292. Named after Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). In Younger, a party who was
being prosecuted in a state court for a violation of a state criminal law brought suit in a
federal court, claiming that the law under which he was being prosecuted violated his
First Amendment rights. Id. at 38.
293. Under this element of Younger abstention, abstention was not proper in a federal
constitutional challenge to the constitutionality of pretrial detention without a judicial
determination of probable cause, since this would not be a defense to the criminal
prosecution, Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 108 n.9 (1975), nor would it be proper in a
federal suit claiming that a state administrative agency could not give a party in a
proceeding before it a full and fair hearing because it was biased against him. Gibson v.
Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 577 (1973).
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should respect the authority of the state courts to protect federal
constitutional rights in the cases pending before them.294 Younger
abstention applies not only to pending state court criminal proceedings,
but also to pending state civil proceedings involving important state
interests, including civil proceedings between private parties.295 Younger
abstention also applies even if the federal suit was brought before the
state court proceeding, since once the state court proceeding has
commenced, the reasons justifying Younger abstention come into play.296
However, Younger abstention only applies where there is a state court
proceeding that is concurrently pending with the federal court
proceeding.297 Where state officials have threatened to prosecute a party
under a state law if that party engages in certain conduct, and the party
alleges an intention to continue to engage in such conduct, the party is
not precluded by Younger abstention from bringing a federal suit seeking
to enjoin the prosecution.298 And where a party has been prosecuted
under a state criminal law, and that prosecution has been completed, the
party can then bring a suit in federal court for a declaration that the law
under which the party was prosecuted is unconstitutional and an
injunction against future prosecutions under it.299
The effect of Younger abstention is to enable the state courts to
maintain control over criminal and civil proceedings pending in those
courts. It is assumed that the state courts will provide the federal plaintiff
with an adequate remedy by which to assert the federal constitutional
claim, and following the conclusion of the state court proceedings
rejecting the constitutional claim, the losing party can seek review in the
United States Supreme Court.300
294. Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-49.
295. Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc. 481 U.S. 1 (1987).
296. Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975).
297. Younger, 401 U.S. at 41-42.
298. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 475 (1974).
299. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 711 (1977). The subsequent federal court suit
is not barred by res judicata, because the parties were different: the state court criminal
case was brought by the state itself, and the subsequent suit was brought against the
prosecutor charged with the enforcement of the challenged law. Id.
300. Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the losing party in a state court proceeding
cannot bring a federal court suit, claiming that the state court judgment violated that
party's federal constitutional rights. Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416
(1923); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482-83 (1983).
The losing party must seek review in the United States Supreme Court pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1257. However, when there are parallel federal court and state court suits
involving the same claim, the federal court is not divested of subject matter jurisdiction
by the fact that the state court rendered its judgment first. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi
Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 292 (2005).
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We have seen then that Congress and the Supreme Court have
imposed certain federalism-based limitations on federal court
jurisdiction. These federalism-based limitations relate to the fact that in
the American constitutional structure there is a dual system of federal
and state courts and that the state court system represents a very
important element of state sovereignty. A nation that establishes a more
modem federalism-based constitutional structure would likely have a
single court system, as, for example, prevails in Canada. 30 1 But this is not
how American federalism has developed, and the dual court system is an
integral part of that structure. Congress and the Supreme Court have
shown respect for state sovereignty in the American constitutional
structure by imposing certain federalism-based limitations on federal
court jurisdiction designed to protect the states and the state court system
from what they considered to be improper interference by the federal
courts.
V. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE STATES
The final component of the American federal system is the
relationship between the states themselves. As stated at the outset, a
primary motivating force behind the adoption of the Constitution was to
transform the loose confederation of sovereign states into one nation, "an
indestructible union composed of indestructible states, ' '30 2 and "to
constitute the citizens of the United States one people as this. '30 3 The
provisions of Article IV, Sections 1 and 2 are directed toward this end.
A. Full Faith and Credit
The Full Faith and Credit Clause of Article IV, Section 1, provides
that "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts,
Records and judicial proceedings of every other state. And the Congress
may by general Laws prescribe the manner in which such Acts, Records
and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof. 30 4 The primary
301. Dep't of Justice of Canada: How the Courts are Organized,
http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/dept-min/pub/ccs-ajc/page3.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2009).
302. Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700, 725 (1868).
303. Paul, 75 U.S. at 180.
304. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. The full faith and credit statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, passed
by the first Congress, simply provides in pertinent part that "[t]he records and judicial
proceedings of any ... State, Territory or Possession ... shall have the same full faith
and credit in every court within the United States and its Territories and Possessions as
they have by law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory or Possession from which
they are taken." Id.
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historical purpose of the Full Faith and Credit Clause was to ensure that
judgments rendered by one state court be recognized by another state
court. In light of that historical purpose, the Supreme Court has held that
the Full Faith and Credit Clause requires maximum recognition of sister
state judgments. °5 This means that the Full Faith and Credit Clause
requires recognition of sister state judgments in circumstances where
principles of private international law would not require recognition of
foreign court judgments. Thus, an American state court cannot refuse
recognition of a sister state judgment on the ground that recognition of
the judgment would offend its "public policy, '30 6 or that it has an interest
in refusing to recognize the judgment.307  Although neither the
constitutional or statutory provision refers to federal court judgments, it
has long been established that they are entitled to recognition in the same
manner as judgments rendered by a state court,30 8 and under the statute,
federal courts must recognize state court judgments as well.
Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause then, a final judgment on the
merits309 rendered by a state court or a federal court must be recognized
305. Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 611 (1951).
306. See Fauntleloy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908). In that case suit was brought in a
Missouri court on a claim governed by Mississippi law. Id. at 223. The Missouri court
misapplied Mississippi law, with the result that it upheld a contract that was illegal under
Mississippi law. Id. at 234. When the plaintiff sought to enforce the Missouri judgment in
Mississippi, the Supreme Court held that the Full Faith and Credit Clause required the
Mississippi court to recognize and enforce the Missouri judgment. Id. at 237-38.
Similarly, while a state is not constitutionally required to entertain a suit for taxes brought
by a sister state, once the claim for taxes is reduced to judgment, that judgment must be
recognized and enforced by a sister state court. See Milwaukee County v. M.E. White
Co., 296 U.S. 268, 279 (1935).
307. See Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202 (1933). In that case, a Georgia
court entered a judgment terminating a father's duty of support to a child. Id. at 205. The
child subsequently moved to South Carolina, and the South Carolina court in a suit
against the father entered an additional order of support. Id. The Supreme Court held that
South Carolina was required to recognize the Georgia judgment as terminating the
father's duty of support. Id. at 212-13.
308. See Stoll v. Gottleib, 305 U.S. 165, 170 (1938).
309. A judgment dismissing a suit on procedural grounds, such that suit is barred by
the statute of limitations or on grounds of public policy, is not a judgment on the merits.
See RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 49 cmt. A (2009). See also Angel v. Bulington, 330
U.S. 183, 189-90 (1947). A custody decree is not a final judgment for full faith and credit
purposes because it is subject to modification by the court that has rendered it in light of
changed conditions. See Kovacs v. Brewer, 356 U.S. 604, 607-08 (1958). In an effort to
prevent endless relitigation of custody questions by courts of different states, Congress in
1980 enacted the federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A, which
generally requires that sister state custody decrees be recognized and enforced by other
sister states in accordance with their terms, and that proceedings to modify the custody
decree be brought before the court that rendered the original decree. 28 U.S.C.A. §
1738A(a) (West 2009).
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by another state court or federal court, subject only to the following
exceptions. One, the judgment may not be recognized if the exercise of
jurisdiction by the rendering court violated due process, provided that the
party challenging it did not appear in the original proceeding. 310 Where
both parties participated in the original proceeding, that court's
determination of its jurisdiction is binding on the parties and may not be
challenged in a subsequent proceeding. 3 11 Two, the judgment is subject
to collateral attack in the state of rendition on grounds such as fraud or
lack of subject matter jurisdiction.3 12 Since the judgment is subject to
collateral attack in the state of rendition, another state may permit the
collateral attack in accordance with the law of the state of rendition,
thereby giving the judgment the same "credit" it has in the state of
rendition. 31 3 Three, enforcement of the judgment is barred by the non-
discriminatory statute of limitations applicable to judgments in the state
where enforcement of the judgment is sought.31 4 Four, the judgment is a
limited effect judgment, such as a worker's compensation decree, which
only determines entitlement to worker's compensation under the law of
the state where the claim is first asserted and is not intended to bar a
subsequent claim for worker's compensation under the law of another
state.315
The Supreme Court has not used the Full Faith and Credit Clause to
limit the power of state courts to apply their own law in preference to the
law of another state. As a general proposition, the constitutional test for
the permissible application of a state's law under the due process and
Full Faith and Credit Clause is co-extensive, 31 6 so that whenever the
application of a state's law is valid as a matter of due process, the state
310. Richards v. Jefferson County, 517 U.S. 793, 797 n.4 (1996).
311. See Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106 (1963). Compare Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp.,
522 U.S. 222, 238 (1998) (holding that an injunction prohibiting one party from testifying
against another party in a subsequent case could not be applied to bar the testimony of
that party in a case brought by a third person in another state court. Since the third person
was not a party to the original proceeding, that court's judgment did not have to be
recognized by the other state court).
312. See, e.g., Thompson v. Whitman, 85 U.S. 457, 469-70 (1873) (holding that the
judgment was subject to collateral attack for lack of subject matter jurisdiction in state of
rendition).
313. Id.
314. Watkins v. Conway, 385 U.S. 188, 190 (1966).
315. See Washington Gas & Light Co. v. Thomas, 448 U.S. 261 (1980).
316. A state may constitutionally apply its own law whenever it has a "significant
contact or significant aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such that choice of
its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair." Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S.
302, 313 (1981). This test imposes very few limitations on a state's application of its own
law, since it will be rare when a state's decision to apply its own law will be arbitrary or
fundamentally unfair.
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will not be required by full faith and credit to apply the law of another
state.31 7 The Supreme Court has specifically rejected the contention that a
state is required to recognize the sovereign immunity of out-of-state
agencies involved in accidents or other controversies with residents of
that state.3t 8
However, under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, a state may not
discriminate against claims existing under the law of a sister state. 319 So,
if a state allows an action for wrongful death under its own law, it may
not refuse to entertain an action for wrongful death brought under the law
of a sister state.32°
B. The Privileges and Immunities Clause
The Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2
provides that, "The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all
Privileges and Immunities of Citizens of the several States."'32' The
Supreme Court has said that the clause prohibits a state from
discriminating against residents of other states with respect to "basic
rights," rights that "bear on the vitality of the Nation as a single entity...
interference with which would frustrate the purposes of the formation of
the Union." 322 Most rights, however, would be considered "basic rights"
for privileges and immunities purposes, such as the right to work within
a state, the right to own property, and the right of access to the courts.
The Court has held violative of the privileges and immunities clause the
following: a state law requiring private employers to give preference to
local residents in employment in all oil and gas operations somehow
connected to state-owned oil and gas reserves;323 a prohibition against the
317. See Pac. Employers Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm'n of Cal., 306 U.S. 493
(1939).
318. See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979); Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 538
U.S. 488 (2003).
319. Pac. Employers Ins., 306 U.S. at 501-02.
320. Hughes, 341 U.S. at 612-13. But it may apply its non-discriminatory statute of
limitations for wrongful death to bar a wrongful death action brought under the law of a
sister state. Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514, 518-19 (1953).
321. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2. The clause protects only individuals, so a corporation is
not a "citizen" for purposes of the clause. Id.
322. Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371, 383 (1978). In that case, the
Court held that the denial of access to elk hunting, a sporting activity, was not a "basic
right," and so upheld a state's rule imposing a substantially higher license fee for non-
residents. Id. at 388.
323. Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 527 (1978).
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admission of non-residents to the practice of law in the state;324 and the
imposition of a "commuters tax" applicable only to nonresidents.
325
The Privileges and Immunities Clause does not prevent a state from
giving preferential treatment to its residents with respect to benefits
directly provided by the state that involve the expenditure of state funds
or the utilization of state resources. 326 Such preference is justified by
considerations of state sovereignty, in that each state is entitled to use the
collective wealth of the state for the benefit of its own residents, whose
welfare is the state's primary concern. 327 So, a state can limit state
employment and attendance at a public university to state residents, or
charge non-resident students higher tuition at a public university. 328 It
can also give state residents preference with respect to access to state-
owned resources. 329 And while discrimination against non-residents with
respect to employment by a private contractor on a state-funded public
works project must be independently justified, such justification may be
found in the state's need to provide employment for disadvantaged
segments of its work force.
330
The Privileges and Immunities Clause is an important limitation on
state power, prohibiting discrimination against non-residents solely
because they are non-residents, and ensuring that Americans are
generally free to carry on their activities within the boundaries of any
state on an equal footing with residents of that state.
C. Interstate Rendition
The interstate rendition clause of Article IV, Section 2 provides that
when a person charged with a crime in one state flees to another state,
the Governor of the state from which that person has fled may demand
that the person be apprehended by the authorities in that state and
324. Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 283 (1985).
325. Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656, 665-66 (1975).
326. Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 388.
327. See id. at 385 (citing Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 552 (C.C. Pa. 1823) (No.
3,230)).
328. See the discussion in Valandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 445 (1973); Saenz v. Roe,
526 U.S. 489, 502 (1999).
329. See, e.g., McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391, 396 (1877) (upholding a state's
exclusion of non-residents from planting oysters in state-owned tidelands).
330. See United Bldg. and Const. Trades Council v. City of Camden, 465 U.S. 208,
222-23 (1984).
331. In this respect, the Privileges and Immunities Clause is a component of the
constitutional right of interstate travel, in that it protects the right to be treated as a
welcome visitor when a citizen of one state is temporarily present in another state. See
the discussion in Saenz, 526 U.S at 500-03.
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returned to the state where the crime has been committed for trial.332
There is no authority to refuse to return that person, and if the Governor
of the state where the person has fled refuses to do so, the federal courts
will order that the person be returned.3 33 The process is commonly
referred to as extradition.
The requirements of Full Faith and Credit, Privileges and
Immunities, and interstate rendition regulate the relationship between the
states themselves. They limit state sovereignty to the extent necessary to
ensure that the United States is "an indestructible union composed of
indestructible states, ' 334 and that the citizens of the United States are
constituted as one people.335
VI. CONCLUSION
In this writing, we have tried to set forth the constitutional basis of
the American federal system. The American federal system as we know
it today was not planned. Rather its structure has evolved over a period
of time as a result of the Court's interpretation of the provisions of the
Constitution dealing with federal and state power and the Court's
development of constitutional policy with respect to the nature and
operation of the American federal system.
We have reviewed and discussed the constitutional doctrine
applicable to the four components of the American federal system: (1)
State sovereignty and constitutional limitations on state power; (2) The
powers of the federal government; (3) The relationship between the
federal government and the states; and (4) The relationship between the
states. In so doing, I have tried to demonstrate that for the most part,
constitutional doctrine relating to federal and state power and to the
relationship between the federal government and the states and between
the states themselves is fairly well-settled and such change as may be
occurring is mostly around the edges. The essential nature of the
American federal system, as it has evolved from many years of
constitutional interpretation by the Supreme Court, remains unchanged.
Precisely because the constitutional doctrine relating to the components
of the American federal system is essentially well-settled, there is no
reason to believe that the essential nature of the American federal system
will change in the future.
332. U.S. CONST. amend art. IV, § 2.
333. Puerto Rico v. Branstad, 483 U.S. 219 ((1987).
334. White, 74 U.S. at 725.
335. Paul, 75 U.S. at 180.
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In the American federal system, state sovereignty over domestic
matters coexists with the power of the federal government, so that the
dominant feature of the American federal system is concurrent power.
There are very few exclusive federal powers, and in the absence of
federal preemption, both the federal government and the states can
usually regulate the same activity. While Congress has the power to
preempt state regulation over particular issues or over particular areas of
activity and could have used preemption to expand federal power over
state power and alter the concurrent power feature of the American
federal system, it has not done so. Rather, both Congress, in specifically
dealing with preemption in the laws it enacts, and the Court, when
deciding questions of preemption, have tried to strike a balance between
the principle of federal supremacy and the principle of state sovereignty,
with the result that federal preemption has not substantially altered the
concurrent power feature of the American system.
An unusual aspect of the American federal system, tracing entirely to
the historical development of state power in light of the principle of state
sovereignty, is the presence of a dual system of federal and state courts,
with a substantial degree of overlapping jurisdiction. If we were starting
anew, we would doubtless have a unitary court system, with jurisdiction
to decide both questions of state law and federal law. But we are not
starting anew, and with the dual court system interacting with the
principle of state sovereignty, Congress and the Court have imposed
certain federalism-based limitations on federal court jurisdiction,
designed to avoid undue interference with state court jurisdiction.
We must also remember, however, that the structure of the American
federal system was designed to bring the states into a national union, that
would transform the loose confederation of sovereign states into one
nation, an "indestructible union composed of indestructible states,"
336
and to "constitute the citizens of the United States as one people."
337
The provisions of Article IV, Section 1, dealing with full faith and
credit, and Article IV, Section 2, dealing with privileges and immunities
of citizens of sister states and interstate rendition, are specifically
directed toward this end. It may also fairly be suggested that the Court, in
interpreting the provisions of the Constitution, dealing with federal and
state power, with the relationship between the federal government and
the states, and the relationship between the states themselves, has not lost
sight of this fundamental objective of the American federal system.
336. White, 74 U.S. at 725.
337. Paul, 75 U.S. at 180.
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This, then, is the American federal system. For better or worse, it is
the system under which we live now and under which we will live in the
future. I hope that in this writing I have succeeded in setting forth the
constitutional basis of the American federal system.
